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ABSTRACT
President Barack Obama committed hundreds of millions of dollars to the Teacher
Incentive Fund (TIF), yet a few fundamental questions remain unanswered—was the
federal program effective? Did student test scores improve? Since the late 19th century,
teachers have been paid for their classroom services regardless of how well—or poorly—
their students performed. Nearly a century later, advocates of education reform continue
to champion teacher compensation policies that link salary to student achievement.
Researchers have identified two motivation theories that must be present in order to have
a successful incentive pay program: goal theory and expectancy theory. The presence or
absence of these theories, have produced mixed results at both the federal and state
levels. Although the Florida Department of Education crafted its own statewide incentive
pay plan, three public school districts have received multimillion dollar awards via
competitive TIF grants.
The purpose of this dissertation was to determine if any differences in learning
gains existed between the 2008 and 2009 Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test®
(FCAT®) Math scores among the students of math teachers at one urban Central Florida
Title I middle school who participated in TIF when compared to the students of math
teachers who did not participate in TIF. The dissertation also analyzed FCAT® Math
scores from 2005 through 2009 in one Central Florida school district to determine if any
trends existed among the Title I middle schools participating in TIF; if any trends existed
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among the Title I middle schools that did not participate in TIF; and if any trends existed
between the two groups when compared to each other.
The literature review and results of this study found that learning gains existed
among students whose teachers participated in TIF. In fact, at one urban Central Florida
middle school, students of math teachers who did not participate in TIF also
demonstrated learning gains. In addition, seven of the ten Title I middle schools from the
same Central Florida district had increased FCAT® Math scores with the implementation
of the TIF grant along with the three Title I middle school that were not eligible to
participate.
This research suggested that the teacher incentive program implemented in a
Central Florida district had a positive impact on learning gains of low-performing
students. The results of the independent-samples tests revealed that there was no
statistical difference in the math scores based on participation in TIF. Students of the
math teachers who participated in TIF demonstrated at least one year‘s academic growth.
Likewise, the findings were similar for students of teachers who opted not to participate
as learning gains increased in this group as well. As a result of these findings,
recommendations for further study include end-of-the-year interviews with TIF-eligible
teachers whose students had learning gains, but chose not to participate. Suggestions for
additional research include surveying teachers whose students had higher scores in the
absence of an incentive program, analyzing the test scores of other subject areas, and
researching other school districts in Florida that were awarded the TIF grant.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
For over a hundred years, public school teachers have been paid according to the
educational services they provided for their students. Since the latter half of the 20th
century, teacher salaries have been adjusted to compensate them for their years of service
and level of education achieved (Clardy, 1988; Goldhaber, 2009; Springer, 2009).
Education leaders and policymakers of the new millennia were advancing the teacher
salary reform continuum by authorizing performance pay policies that rewarded teachers
in low-performing schools for improving their students‘ standardized test scores (Neal,
2009; Springer). The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) was a federally funded performance
pay program intended to close the achievement gap between low-performing students and
their higher achieving counterparts (U.S. Department of Education, 2009b).
There have been relatively few comprehensive studies conducted on the various
schools receiving TIF, yet hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars have been committed
to the newest wave of teacher compensation reform (Obama, 2009a, Springer, 2009). In
this dissertation, Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® (FCAT®) Math scores from
urban Title I middle schools in a Central Florida district that participated in the federal
program were analyzed. These results provided insight into the effectiveness of incentive
programs that rewarded classroom teachers for increasing academic achievement.
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Background
Recruiting and retaining highly qualified teachers has long been a challenge for
many school administrators. Nowhere has the situation been felt more acutely than in the
classrooms of urban schools as federal and state legislative mandates penalize districts for
failing to raise the academic performance of low-performing students (Neal, 2009). In an
attempt to fill this critical need for highly effective educators, policymakers have
supported implementing incentive pay programs aimed at improving quality through
offering cash bonuses to teachers who have increased student standardized test scores
(Lavy, 2007; McNeil, 2007; Neal; Obama, 2009a; Springer, 2009).
On the evening of February, 24th, 2009, President Barack Obama delivered a
speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress that revealed the objectives of his
unprecedented economic stimulus package, the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 (ARRA). During his oratory, he made a promise to America‘s children that
―the goal of this administration [was] to ensure that every child [had] access to a
complete and competitive education—from the day they are born to the day they begin a
career‖ (Obama, 2009a, p. 5). In an effort to achieve this goal, the ARRA allocated new
incentives for teacher performance, pathways for advancement, and rewards for academic
success. The President‘s economic plan included increased funding for ―innovative
programs that [were] already helping schools meet high standards and close achievement
gaps‖ (Obama, 2009a, p. 5). The innovative program that Mr. Obama referred to in his
speech was called the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF). The purpose of TIF, a five-year
2

competitive grant initiative, was to support performance-based programs that improved
academic achievement among low-performing students in high-needs schools (U.S.
Department of Education, 2009b).
There were several terms that were commonly used among educators and
policymakers when describing the rewarding of superior teacher performance with
financial compensation. Merit pay, performance pay, pay-for-performance, and incentive
pay programs were just a few of the terms that were synonymous to initiatives in which
student standardized test results were used to assess teacher effectiveness in the
classroom (Goldhaber, 2009; Heneman, 1992; Lavy, 2007; McNeil, 2007; Miller & Say,
1982; Ryan, 2009; Springer, 2009). Regardless of what the compensation system was
called, linking a teacher‘s pay to his/her students‘ performance was a type of education
reform designed to recruit and to retain quality teachers, while at the same time
increasing academic outcomes among low-performing minority students, preferably in
high-needs schools (Lavy; Miller & Say; Obama, 2009a; Ryan; U.S. Department of
Education, 2009b).
For most incentive pay programs, a teacher‘s effectiveness in the classroom was
measured through the standardized test results of his/her students. The TIF grant used the
Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® (FCAT®) to determine whether or not
participating teachers received bonuses based on their students‘ learning gains (U.S.
Department of Education, 2007). The FCAT® Sunshine State Standards (SSS) Reading
and Mathematics were the standardized tests administered every year to Florida public
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school children in grades three through ten. The quantitative results were reported by
scale score and by Developmental Scale Score (DSS). Scale scores were used to
determine a student‘s achievement level for each grade and subject tested. The DSS score
was established to follow a child‘s academic progress over time and across grade levels
(Florida Department of Education, 2009a). Table 1 and Table 2 illustrate the FCAT® DSS
and scale scores, respectively, used in middle schools for grades six through eight.

Table 1
FCAT® Mathematics Developmental Scale Scores (DSS)
Grade
6
7
8

Level 1
770 - 1553
958 - 1660
1025 - 1732

Level 2
1554 - 1691
1661 - 1785
1733 - 1850

Level 3
1692 - 1859
1786 - 1938
1851 - 1997

Level 4
1860 - 2018
1939 - 2079
1998 - 2091

Level 5
2019 - 2492
2080 - 2572
2092 - 2605

Level 4
354 - 390
344 - 378
347 - 370

Level 5
391 - 500
379 - 500
371 - 500

Note. From Florida Department of Education, 2008.

Table 2
FCAT® Mathematics Scale Scores
Grade
6
7
8

Level 1
100 - 282
100 - 274
100 - 279

Level 2
283 - 314
275 - 305
280 - 309

Level 3
315 - 353
306 - 343
310 - 346

Note. From Florida Department of Education, 2008.

For example, a low-performing seventh grade student who scored at an FCAT®
Level 2 for two years in a row, yet showed an increase in DSS scores (e.g. 85 points)
during the same period of time would have demonstrated that an annual learning gain had
4

occurred. A learning gain had occurred when a low-performing FCAT® Level 1 or 2
student had met or exceeded a designated threshold of academic mastery based on his/her
DSS score from one year to the next (Florida Department of Education, 2008). A higher
performing student who had consistently scored at FCAT® Level 3, 4, or 5 on consecutive
tests also was considered to have achieved a learning gain (see Appendix A). The annual
learning gains of low-performing students and higher performing students were measured
using different methods. A teacher was described as highly effective when learning gains
were made among the majority of his/her students. This study compared any differences
between the 2008 and 2009 FCAT® Math DSS scores of students in grades six through
eight at an urban Title I middle school to determine if any learning gains occurred based
on criteria set by the state of Florida (see Table 3).

Table 3
One Year‘s Growth Definition (Learning Gains) for FCAT® Math DSS
Grade
DSS

4
164

5
119

6
95

7
78

8
64

9
54

10
48

Note. Retained students cannot demonstrate learning gains using DSS. From Florida Department of
Education, 2007b.

Statement of the Problem
Performance pay programs addressed two critical problems in the public education
system: attracting and retaining highly-qualified teachers and improving academic
outcomes among low-performing students. The passing of the No Child Left Behind Act
5

of 2001 (NCLB), had underscored America‘s need for highly effective teachers,
especially in high-minority, low-income, high-needs urban schools (U.S. Department of
Education, 2009a). The Obama Administration‘s Race to the Top education grant
initiatives provided funding for areas of school reform that emphasized recruiting,
retaining, and rewarding effective teachers and principals (U.S. Department of Education,
2010). Consequently, there was growing concern among education policymakers about
the declining quality of teachers. The decades of improvement in overall job
opportunities had led to a reduction in the pool of qualified applicants for teaching
positions (Springer, 2009). During the same period, depreciating teacher pay scales had
channeled the best educators into more lucrative occupations (Odden & Kelley, 1997,
2002; Springer, 2009). In an effort to counteract this alarming trend, stakeholders and
policymakers hoped to design effective incentives that would attract, retain, and motivate
highly-qualified and effective teachers (Neal, 2009; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002;
Springer).
―The future belongs to the nation that best educates its citizens‖ (Obama, 2009b, p.
2). President Obama spoke these words to the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce,
where he acknowledged that ―a stubborn [education] gap persists between how well
white students are doing compared to their African-American and Latino classmates‖
(Obama, 2009b, p. 2). Quality education was widely recognized as one of the most
important vehicles to overcome the devastating effects of economic disparities and social
inequalities. A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Education Reform, a study by the
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National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) found that students who
attended schools in underprivileged neighborhoods often lacked access to a quality
education, which in turn, reduced their chances to acquire the academic skills needed to
break the cycle of poverty and hopelessness. While the classroom talent and pedagogic
knowledge of highly qualified instructors was desperately needed across the education
spectrum, nowhere was that need more amplified than in the high-needs schools that
served poor minority inner-city children (National Commission on Excellence in
Education; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002; Ryan, 2009; Springer, 2009).

Purpose of Study
The purpose of this dissertation was to determine if any differences in learning
gains existed between the 2008 and 2009 Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test®
(FCAT®) Math scores among the students of math teachers at one urban Central Florida
Title I middle school who participated in TIF when compared to the students of math
teachers at the same Title I middle school who did not participate. The dissertation also
analyzed FCAT® Math scores from 2005 through 2009 in one Central Florida school
district to determine if any trends existed among the Title I middle schools participating
in TIF; if any trends existed among the Title I middle schools that did not participate; and
if any trends existed between the two groups when compared to each other.
The significance of this study was to provide insight into the efficacy of teacher
performance pay programs, particularly those sustained with large infusions of federal
7

and state taxpayer funds. The conclusions of this study were based on actual student
scores and school-level data, collected in a manner similar to the aggregate school-level
data used in other research (Springer, Ballou, & Peng, 2008). These findings will
contribute to the body of literature on education policies and teacher salary reform
studies.
As we moved into the 21st century, our education system was in need of successful
salary reform programs that encouraged talented individuals to enter the teaching
profession and to make the long-term commitment of educating America‘s
underprivileged children in urban schools (Neal, 2009; Ryan, 2009; Springer, 2009).
President Obama was an advocate for teacher incentive programs by allocating hundreds
of millions of taxpayer dollars (Obama, 2009a; U.S. Department of Education, 2010).
Governor Crist voiced his political support for merit pay plans that would ultimately
benefit Florida‘s school children (Florida Department of Education, 2007a). However,
critics of these types of education and salary reform measures pointed to a lack of followup research to determine the effectiveness of the policies, especially as political leaders
pledged continued financial support (Springer).

Research Questions
To solidify his commitment to education reform, President Obama‘s economic
stimulus policy, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA),
earmarked over $687 million taxpayer dollars in funding for performance pay initiatives
8

(Chait & Miller, 2009a, 2009b). Moreover, the $4.35 billion Race to the Top fund
provided competitive federal grants that championed school reform policies (U.S.
Department of Education, 2010). Race to the Top awarded comprehensive state education
programs that were implementing innovative initiatives that focused on recruiting and
rewarding effective teachers and administrators in high-needs schools that increased
academic achievement. The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grant, initiated under the
George W. Bush Administration with continued support of the Obama Administration,
was designed to improve academic achievement among low-performing students (U.S.
Department of Education, 2009b, 2010). Therefore, the four research questions of this
study focused on the standardized test results of academically struggling students in a
Central Florida school district that was in the second year of a TIF grant:
1. What differences in learning gains existed, if any, between the 2008 and 2009
Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® Math scores among the students of
math teachers at one urban Central Florida Title I middle school who
participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund when compared to the students of
math teachers who did not participate?
2. What trends in the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® Math scores
from 2005 through 2009 existed, if any, among the Title I middle schools in
one Central Florida school district that participated in the Teacher Incentive
Fund?
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3. What trends in the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® Math scores
from 2005 through 2009 existed, if any, among the Title I middle schools in
one Central Florida school district that did not participate in the Teacher
Incentive Fund?
4. What trends in the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® Math scores
from 2005 through 2009 existed, if any, between the two groups when
compared to each other?

Delimitations/Assumptions
The writing style of this dissertation was based on the Publication Manual of the
American Psychological Association, Sixth Edition (American Psychological
Association, 2010). Furthermore, the data gathered for this study came from two sources:
the 2008 and 2009 FCAT® Math student scores were collected from one TIF Title I
middle school in a Central Florida district and the 2005 through 2009 FCAT® Math
middle school scores, also from a Central Florida district, were retrieved from the Florida
Department of Education‘s publicly accessible website.
Four subject areas were tested on the FCAT® exams: reading, math, writing, and
science. There were two reasons that FCAT® Math scores were chosen for this study.
First, math was tested every year in middle school from sixth through eighth grade,
unlike writing and science, in which each were tested only once in middle school during
eighth grade. Learning gains must be measured using consecutive annual scores. Second,
10

a student‘s math score was influenced by only one teacher, unlike a student‘s reading
score which could be attributed to as many as three different content-area teachers—
Language Arts, Reading, and English Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL).
Although there were ten secondary schools participating in TIF in this Central
Florida district, the data, findings, and conclusions in this study were limited to the seven
participating Title I middle schools. The relationships, if any, of the scores at the
participating Title I high schools were beyond the scope of this study. In addition, the
data from these seven schools were compared to the three Title I middle schools that did
not qualify for the TIF program. For the program in the Central Florida school district,
eligibility to participate in TIF was based on the feeder patterns of its three Title I high
schools (Orange County Public Schools, 2009e). Of the ten Title I middle schools in the
district, only seven of them were zoned to send the majority of its students to the three
Title I high schools. These seven Title I middle schools eligible to participate in the TIF
were the primary focus of this study.
A preliminary investigation revealed that the majority of the math teachers at the
Central Florida middle school in this study participated in the first year of the TIF grant
during the 2007 – 2008 school year. Also, according to the information in the report from
the first year of the TIF grant, over half of the nearly 1000 teachers and administrators at
the TIF schools in Orange County (FL) participated (U.S. Department of Education,
2007). Moreover, results of the end-of-year teacher surveys in the same report indicated
continued support and participation by the respondents. Consequently, the conclusions of
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this study were based on the assumption that the majority of instructional and
administrative staff continued to participate during the second year of the TIF grant.

Chapter Summary
Policymakers on education reform legislated hundreds of millions of taxpayer
dollars for teacher incentive programs, even though there was limited research
documenting their effectiveness. This dissertation will assess the impact of the Teacher
Incentive Fund on low-performing students at an urban Title I middle school located in
Central Florida during the second year of its implementation. In addition, FCAT® Math
scores will be analyzed from ten Title I middle schools in the same school district over a
period of five years. The results of these data will expose any trends in student outcomes
that may have been influenced by the implementation of teacher performance pay
initiatives.
This dissertation is made up of five chapters. Chapter One introduced the
background and statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, and the four research
questions. Other components of this chapter included the significance of the study as well
as a section on delimitations and assumptions. Chapter Two provided a brief overview of
the evolution of the teacher pay system in the United States from the end of the 20th
century to the present followed by a review of the theories of motivation associated with
performance pay programs. Teacher attitudes toward performance pay programs were
surveyed and international perspectives from four countries were reviewed. Florida‘s
12

previous and current experiences with performance pay plans were explored, including a
Teacher Incentive Fund that was awarded to three Florida school districts. The chapter
ended with the results of Orange County Public School‘s first year in the Teacher
Incentive Fund. Chapter Three described the research design and methodology of the
study. Details of the research design, data gathering and sampling procedures,
instrumentation, and research questions were given along with a discussion of the
statistical analysis procedures and ethical considerations of the collected data. Chapter
Four presented the detailed findings of the research. In Chapter Five, the conclusions
reached in this dissertation supported the findings of previous studies on the efficacy of
teacher performance pay programs. At the end of the chapter are recommendations for
further research.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW
Teacher pay structures have transformed into several systems of compensation
since the era of the one room schoolhouses that dotted the landscape of rural America.
From providing room and board supplements during the late 19th century to the single
salary schedule used today, education leaders have sought to design a pay scale for
teachers that recognized their efforts in the classroom and encouraged others to enter the
profession. The 1983 federal report, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative For Education
Reform, concluded that teachers who demonstrated superior pedagogic skills and
knowledge should receive bonuses. By the early 21st century, a merit-based compensation
policy had been drafted and adopted by federal legislators—the Teacher Incentive Fund
(TIF). A primary goal of this performance pay program was to reward teachers who
increased academic achievement among their low-performing students. Supporters of
these initiatives hoped that offering financial bonuses would attract and retain highquality effective educators and close the achievement gap.
In this chapter, six topics will be discussed: evolution of the teacher pay system, an
overview of teacher performance pay programs, the Teacher Incentive Fund, Florida‘s
experience with performance pay programs, Florida TIF grantees, and Orange County
(FL) Public School‘s survey results after its first year of implementing TIF.
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Evolution of Teacher Pay System
The teacher pay system has evolved over the past hundred years from the modest
wages of the pre-Industrial Age to the modern structure of educators receiving salaries
based on education level and classroom experience (Goldhaber, 2009; Springer, 2009).
Since the late 19th century, there have been three major types of teacher pay systems:
supplying educators with room and board to supplement salary; differentiated salary, a
grade-based payment scale; and the single salary schedule in use today (Goldhaber;
Podgursky, 2009; Protsik, 1995; Springer).

Room and Board Supplement
In the late 1800s, the utilitarian one-room school house was a common educational
fixture across rural America. These schools were specifically designed to serve the
agricultural communities that dotted the American countryside (Clardy, 1988; Springer,
2009). However, teachers in rural schoolhouses generally lacked professional training or
certification, in fact, the extent of their own pedagogic capacity rarely extended beyond
elementary education (Spring, 1994). An individual could secure a teaching position if
s/he possessed a basic understanding of reading, writing, and arithmetic skills; was
determined to exhibit high moral character; and personified middle-class values (Tyack
& Strober, 1981).
During this time, teaching was considered neither a career nor a profession. Protsik
(1995) found that women, who overwhelmingly made up the pool of schoolteachers,
15

were prohibited from working in the classroom after marriage, while the small cadre of
men who entered the field, generally did so as an income supplement to their primary
responsibility—farming. When taken together, local education officials found little
incentive to invest significant amounts of financial resources into the salaries of teachers.
As a matter of practice, teachers were given room and board by their students‘ parents in
an effort to supplement the meager salaries (Protsik).
Spring (1994) revealed that providing room and board for its schoolteachers had
distinct advantages for the community. For instance, the lifestyle of the teacher was under
constant supervision by the hosting family. Because most educators lacked professional
training, the housing arrangements provided a type of accountability to the townspeople.
Unfortunately, the public scrutiny into their private lives on top of the low wages
discouraged women and men from committing to long-term teaching jobs (Spring).

Differentiated Salary
Protsik (1995) and Springer (2009) noted in their research that by the early 1900s,
American society migrated from sprawling rural farms to incommodious urban centers.
Additionally, the economic demands of the Industrial Revolution mandated changes to
the nation‘s schools (Protsik; Springer). As the populace shifted to urban centers,
specialized employment skills needed in city factories required school leaders to design a
more sophisticated curriculum. Tyack‘s (1974) study explained how the one-room
schoolhouse gave way to graded schools—placing students by age and ability into
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separate classrooms with appropriate levels of rigor. Springer (2009) expanded on
Tyack‘s findings as Springer noted that teachers were paid according to the grade level of
their students. In response to these pedagogic and curricular changes, education reformers
decided that teachers needed professional training; they were required to become certified
by either graduating from teaching colleges or institutions or passing a county
examination (Tyack, 1974).
With the establishment of graded schools and teacher certification requirements,
came a redesign of salary structures. Although many states adhered to a minimum salary
level, individual cities commonly created differentiated salary schedules based on a
teacher‘s years of experience, gender, race, and the grade level taught (Podgursky, 2009;
Tyack & Strober, 1981). Both systems—minimum salary level and differentiated salary
schedule—were created with the goal of reducing high teacher turnover due to low
salaries and to encourage others to enter the profession. According to Rothman (1978),
the average urban teacher remained in the field of education for nearly a decade as a
result of the differentiated pay schedule.
The overtly sexist (men were paid more than women) and racist (whites were paid
more than blacks) salary allocation practices within the system led to the eventual demise
of the differentiated pay scale. The notion of ―equal pay for equal work‖ ushered in the
salary system that was prevalent in most school districts across the country (Goldhaber,
2009; Podgursky, 2009; Protsik, 1995). All classroom instructors were paid at the same
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scale regardless of race, gender, or grade level taught giving rise to the name—single
salary schedule (Educational Research Service, 1978).

Single Salary Schedule
The single salary schedule was a table in which an instructor‘s educational status
and years of teaching experience dictated the amount of his/her annual compensation
(Clardy, 1988; Goldhaber, 2009; Podgursky, 2009). In Table 4, an example of the single
salary schedule that was used in Duval County (FL) Public Schools illustrated how each
column represented a teacher‘s level of education, such as bachelor‘s degree or master‘s
degree, while the rows designated the number of years of teaching experience. To
determine an individual‘s annual salary, the teacher would locate the cell created by the
intersection of the appropriate educational level and years of experience (Clardy;
Podgursky). Table 5 illustrates an example of a variation to the single salary table that
was used in Miami-Dade County (FL) Public Schools that included a supplement for
advanced degrees in addition to one‘s regular compensation.
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Table 4
2009 – 2010 Single Salary Schedule: Duval County (FL) Public Schools
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
95

Bachelor‘s
37,300
37,439
37,629
37,902
38,284
38,693
39,078
39,505
40,196
40,721
41,260
41,958
42,961
43,540
44,117
44,983
45,831
46,486
48,290
50,648
53,437
55,515
57,052
65,301

Master‘s
38,300
38,449
38,643
39,074
39,541
40,085
40,455
40,771
41,358
41,972
42,598
43,300
44,115
44,744
45,349
46,316
46,941
47,459
50,454
53,617
56,584
58,537
59,996
68,449

Specialist
39,300
39,748
40,105
40,518
40,946
41,319
41,730
42,214
42,804
43,446
44,042
44,865
45,618
47,058
48,132
48,991
49,659
50,156
52,415
55,101
58,160
59,991
61,342
69,888

Note. From Duval County Public Schools, 2010.
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Doctor‘s
40,300
41,161
41,539
41,972
42,419
42,793
43,177
43,663
44,288
44,876
45,974
46,919
47,919
48,858
49,584
50,436
51,111
51,511
53,746
56,926
60,093
62,047
63,354
71,891

Table 5
2009 – 2010 Salary Schedule: Miami-Dade County (FL) Public Schools
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
15
17
19
20
21
22

Bachelor's
38,000
38,190
38,381
38,573
38,766
38,960
39,154
39,350
39,547
39,745
39,943
40,143
41,400
*******
47,000
*******
50,300
*******
53,100
54,350
58,350
68,225

Supplement for
Advanced Degrees
3,100
Master's
5,150
Specialist
7,200
Doctorate
Note. From Miami-Dade County Public Schools, 2010.
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Modest pay increases occurred annually after the completion of another
consecutive year of service, following an expected advance up the ―steps‖ within each
educational level (Clardy, 1988). Podgursky (2009) recognized that there were two types
of performance behaviors that these salary structures identify as important: longevity and
continued education. Financial incentives came from continued employment within the
school district and from acquiring additional advanced college degrees (Clardy;
Goldhaber, 2009; Podgursky). These pay structures provided no recognition of how
effectively a teacher performed in the classroom. An increase in salary would occur every
year regardless of instructional skills or student achievement (Goldhaber).
The single salary structure was a ―nearly universal feature‖ of the majority of
school districts across America. Podgursky (2009) noted in his research that 96 percent of
public school districts reported using some type of salary schedule. The premise of this
popular salary plan was that instructional and pedagogic knowledge ―improve[d] with
each year spent in the classroom and with each additional hour of college completed‖
(Clardy, 1988, p. 15). Ironically, there was a lack empirical evidence to support a
correlation between continued education and better teaching (Ferris & Winkler, 1986;
Greenwald, Hedges, & Laine, 1996; Hanushek, 1989; Podgursky; Springer, 2009).
The single salary schedule addressed the inequities of the differentiated pay scale.
Protsik (1995) discovered that teachers were paid for how long they were in the
classroom and what college degree they held—arguably equitable and objective
characteristics. On the other hand, education reformers pointed out that the single salary
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schedule ―treats teachers with the same education level and experience as equals, despite
unequal performance and skills‖ (Protsik, p. 12). Furthermore, an unintended
consequence of the single salary system that impacted low-performing students was that
teachers with less classroom experience within a school district received the lowest pay
and were most often assigned to the high-needs schools (Podgursky, 2009; Ryan, 2009).

Teacher Salary Reform
A major reason teachers cited for entering the profession was the satisfaction of
working with children (Goodlad, 1984). On the other hand, these same teachers noted the
low salaries as a major reason for leaving. In their opinion, the meager compensation sent
a message that their instructional services were undervalued. For many, the intention to
become long-term educators evaporated upon experiencing tedious, non-student related,
day-to-day activities with less than rewarding salaries. Ferris and Winkler (1986)
discovered that attracting highly qualified individuals into teaching required raising
beginning salaries. In addition, increasing the average annual pay would reduce mass
exodus. Spuck (1974) also noted that offering extrinsic rewards attracted and retained
teachers. Using a market-based approach, Podgursky (2009) concluded that teachers who
demonstrated a high level of efficiency should receive a higher level of compensation.
When surveyed, teachers believed that increasing salaries would most likely attract
and retain qualified educators (U.S. Department of Education, 2007). Their career
decisions were based largely on future annual income; such as the decision to pursue a
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teaching profession, the decision to stay in certain school districts (as opposed to
relocating to another district with higher salaries), and the decision to abandon the field
altogether (Bobbitt, 1989). Providing decent salaries would go a long way towards
keeping teachers in the profession and reducing turnover rates (Bobbitt; Springer, 2009;
Vigdor, 2009).
In 1983, the groundbreaking federal report, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative For
Educational Reform, strongly recommended a teacher compensation scheme that was
―professionally competitive, market-sensitive, and performance-based‖ (National
Commission on Excellence in Education, p. 26). According to the report, salary reform
should reward superior teachers, encourage average ones, and either improve or terminate
ineffective educators. In response to this recommendation, education advocates and
policy makers have supported performance pay programs that rewarded teachers who
demonstrated a greater level of student achievement. By making salary contingent on a
teacher‘s effectiveness, individual motivation to do an outstanding job should increase
(Clardy, 1988; Podgursky, 2009; Springer, 2009).

Teacher Performance Pay Programs
Performance pay policy options to improve teaching quality could be grouped into
three basic categories: (a) policies that improved teacher preparation and professional
development, (b) policies that affected who became a teacher and how long the person
remained in the field, and (c) policies that affected the work that teachers did in the
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classroom (Vegas, 1994). Federal TIF grants underwrite state performance pay programs
that created financial incentives that motivated talented teachers and encouraged qualified
individuals to enter the teaching profession. In addition, there was a TIF requirement to
provide supplementary professional development opportunities for its participants (U.S.
Department of Education, 2009b).
Increased academic standards, as mandated by local, state, and federal agencies,
were making significant demands on teachers for increasing curriculum knowledge,
instructional skills, job performance, and student achievements. Previous salary reform
programs did little to emphasize continuous professional development of specific
pedagogic skills identified by school administrators as important to improving the
academic success of low-performing minority students (Bacharach & Conley, 1986).
Performance pay was used to reward teachers with bonuses for increased student
achievement and to provide a stronger incentive for continuous professional
improvement. Lawler (1990) discovered that a more effective long-term performance
strategy was to award the bonus independent of a teacher‘s base salary, thereby making it
necessary to review the teacher‘s performance each school year.

Theories of Motivation
There were two motivation theories whose behavioral responses were more
closely identified with the structure of business organizations that education
administrators and policymakers hoped would transfer to public school settings. Goal24

setting theory and expectancy theory explained how teachers were motivated and the
roles that incentive programs could play (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002).

Goal-Setting Theory
Locke (1968) proposed the goal-setting theory to explain a psychological
phenomenon associated with employee motivation. The general premise of the theory
was that ―goals motivate[d] employee behavior when they [were] specific, challenging,
and accepted as worthwhile and achievable‖ (Odden & Kelley, 1997, p. 60). Additional
research has shown that identifying attainable and measureable goals would encourage an
employee to reach beyond previous performance levels. (Mento, Steel, & Karren, 1987;
Mohrman & Lawler, 1996; Podgursky, 2009; Rowan, 1996).
Offering incentive pay could enhance goal-setting behavior when monetary
rewards were attached to surpassing specific measureable goals. Financial rewards
increased an individual‘s commitment to reaching goals (Wright, 1989). Additional
empirical evidence from Heneman (1992) underscored Wright‘s findings—challenging
goals did not discourage participation in performance pay programs. In the aggregate,
these results highlighted the importance of establishing goals. Employee motivation
would be highest when attainable, measurable goals and monetary rewards were tied
together—e.g. performance pay programs—rather than as unrelated activities (Heneman).
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Expectancy Theory
Expectancy theory also could be used to predict employee behavior when designing
an effective performance pay program (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002). According to the
theory, individuals were more likely to participate in incentive programs when three
conditions existed: expectancy, line of sight, and valence (Cumming, 1994; Heneman &
Schwab, 1979; Heneman, Schwab, Fossum, & Dyer, 1989; Johnson, 1986; Lawler, 1986,
1990; Welbourne & Mejia, 1995). The expectancy condition includes in the underlying
beliefs of the individual as s/he perceived the characteristics of the goal. For instance, a
participant must have believed that the goal was both attainable and within his/her
control. One also must have believed that accomplishing the goal was realistic and that
s/he possessed the ability and skill needed to satisfy all of the requirements to receive the
reward (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002).
Odden and Kelley (1997, 2002) identified that the next condition, line of sight,
required participants to envision a positive correlation between their own performance
and receiving the bonus and that the final condition of valence, participants must consider
the incentive deserving of their time and effort. Vast amounts of empirical research have
established that performance pay programs that included these three conditions have been
most persuasive toward stimulating employee motivation (Blinder, 1990; Heneman,
1992; Heneman et al., 1989; Kennedy, Fossum, & White, 1983; Lawler, 1971, 1990;
Wanous, Keon, & Latack, 1983; Welbourne & Mejia, 1995).
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While goal-setting and expectancy theories helped explain an employee‘s
psychological propensity to engage in performance pay programs, both intrinsic and
extrinsic motivating factors contributed to behavior decisions as well. Odden & Kelley
(1997, 2002) and Podgursky (2009) reported that strong intrinsic motivators describe
attainable goals and allow adequate professional development opportunities whereas
performance objectives accurately demonstrate a teacher‘s effectiveness in the classroom.
In addition, their combined research also highlighted that extrinsic motivators should
include appealing financial incentives, continuous administrative support, and effective
collaboration among one‘s peers. Not surprisingly, extrinsic motivating factors could
reinforce intrinsic ones and vice versa. The most efficacious performance pay programs
brought together aspects of motivation theories and motivating factors (Odden & Kelley,
1997, 2002).

Teacher Attitudes Toward a Performance Pay Program
An online survey of teachers in 199 traditional public and magnet schools in
Hillsborough County (FL) was administered at the end of the 2006 – 2007 school year;
1691 teachers responded (Jacob & Springer, 2008). The authors of this study found mild
support for performance pay incentives among teachers and a weak relationship between
teachers‘ characteristics and their views on performance pay initiatives. In addition,
―teachers who [had] a more positive view of their principal‘s leadership ability and more
confidence in their own teaching ability‖ were more likely to support incentive programs
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(Jacob & Springer, 2008, p. 1). Jacob and Springer chose the teachers in Hillsborough
County for their study because education reformers in this school district had
―successfully designed and implemented several financial incentive programs, including
teacher recruitment and retention bonuses for working in hard-to-staff schools or subject
areas‖ (p. 3). While it should be noted that their survey instrument did not identify a
specific incentive program, the teachers‘ responses could provide some insight into their
attitudes towards performance-based initiatives similar to the federal program. A year
after this survey was conducted, Hillsborough County Public Schools, along with two
other Florida school districts, was awarded a Teacher Incentive Fund grant for the 2007 –
2008 school year (U.S. Department of Education, 2009c).
Some of the key findings of Jacob and Springer‘s (2008) study were that teachers
favored bonuses based on individual performance rather than school or group
performance. However, over half of the teachers were concerned that competitive
rewards would destroy the ―collaborative culture of teaching.‖ Almost a third believed
that implementing these programs would encourage teachers to work harder (Jacob &
Springer).
Jacob and Springer (2008) discovered a weak relationship between teacher
demographics and views on incentive pay programs. For example, gender and race were
not correlated with supporting performance pay. Also, the number of students in the
school (school size) nor the average achievement level of the school (school grade) were
related to attitudes towards performance initiatives. Yet, years of teaching experience did
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impact their opinions. Novice teachers with one to three years of experience were more
supportive of incentive pay than veteran teachers with more than 20 years of experience.
Secondary school teachers heavily favored incentive pay over elementary school teachers
(Jacob & Springer).
The report also noted that a teacher who viewed his/her principal as an effective
school leader supported incentive programs. The survey defined an effective principal as
a school leader who set high standards for teaching, allocated time for professional
development, and provided the resources needed for quality instruction (Jacob &
Springer, 2008). And finally, teachers who were confident in their subject-area
knowledge and pedagogic abilities were more likely to view incentive programs as a
positive enticement. Jacob and Springer concluded that the respondents in their survey
expressed favorable opinions on teacher incentive programs in general. However, it
should be noted these positive findings may not necessarily translate into active
participation or widespread support for specific teacher incentive pay plans (e.g. the
Teacher Incentive Fund).

Teacher Performance Pay Programs: International Perspectives
Teacher salary reform was not solely an American education policy phenomenon.
Several countries, such as India, Israel, Kenya, and Mexico, have implemented incentive
programs that when taken collectively yielded mixed results. For example in India,
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2008) discovered that performance pay programs
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improved academic achievement and encouraged positive classroom behavioral changes
among teachers. On mathematics and language tests, students whose teachers participated
in incentive programs outperformed their counterparts who did not participate. Moreover,
teachers who participated in the programs were found to have assigned more homework,
offered tutoring sessions outside of class time, and focused attention on the academic
progress of low-performing students (Muralidharan & Sundararaman).
The findings of Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2008) supported Lavy‘s (2002)
research on performance pay programs in Israel. Lavy‘s report also documented
improved instructional strategies that were attributed to the implementation of the
program. Lavy discovered ―a positive and statistically significant‖ impact on student
academic achievement from an incentive program designed to reduce student drop-out
rates. A survey of teacher attitudes and behaviors revealed positive changes in teaching
practices and effort, while adjusting their instructional strategies for low-performing
students (Lavy).
Glewwe, Holla, and Kremer (2008) reported that Kenyan students of teachers who
were eligible to receive bonuses scored better on standardized tests. Students whose
teachers participated in performance pay programs had ―noticeably higher‖ scores on
standardized tests than students of teachers who did not participate. Participating teachers
were also more likely to offer test preparation sessions beyond the regular school day
(Glewwe et al.).
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A comprehensive evaluation of an incentive program in Mexico conducted by
Santibañez et al. (2007) revealed encouraging—albeit small—effects on secondary
students. Bonuses were awarded based on the accumulation of points on a variety of
criteria as defined by the incentive plan, including years of experience, highest degree
held, professional development activities, the teacher‘s performance on a subject-matter
knowledge test, and their students‘ test scores (Santibañez et al.). The authors of this
study noted that the program‘s extensive award criteria may have not motivated teachers
to exert the amount of effort necessary to yield dramatic increases in student scores.

Teacher Incentive Fund
The education policy recommendations in A Nation at Risk, underscored the need
for a salary reform program that would reward superior teachers whose students achieved
academic greatness (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). Nearly
twenty years later, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, required that all public school
students, especially those who were in high-minority, high-poverty locations, were to be
taught by highly-effective teachers (U.S. Department of Education, 2009a). With these
goals in mind, President George W. Bush proposed in his 2006 budget a teacher
performance pay initiative, the Teacher Incentive Fund (Chait & Miller, 2009a).
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) was created to more closely align salary
structures with quality teaching and increased student learning, while at the same time
provided incentives to attract dedicated individuals to high-needs schools (U.S.
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Department of Education, 2009b). When first implemented during the 2007 – 2008
school year, TIF provided $50 million dollars in competitive grants for states to design
incentive programs that recognized and rewarded highly-effective teachers. Over the next
two years, TIF awarded more than 30 competitive five-year grants stimulating growth in
various state departments of education and local school boards for teacher salary reform
policies (see Appendix B). During that time, the increase in funding had been dramatic—
from $97 million in fiscal year 2009 to $487.3 million in fiscal year 2010 (Chait &
Miller, 2009b). On top of that nearly five-fold endowment, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 infused another $200 million (Chait & Miller, 2009a; Obama,
2009a). Last, but not least, the Race to the Top fund awarded $4.35 billion in competitive
grants for various education reform projects, including teacher incentive pay programs
(U.S. Department of Education, 2010).
The Teacher Incentive Fund was a five-year federal competitive grant program that
supported the development and implementation of performance-based teacher reward
systems, based primarily on increased student achievement in high-needs public schools
(U.S. Department of Education, 2009b). All local educational agencies (LEAs), e.g.
public school districts, were eligible to apply provided the incentive program was to be
implemented in schools with more than 30 percent of its student enrollment from lowincome families. Approved grant applications contained well-defined and attainable
student achievement goals, opportunities for professional development training and
support, and on-going instructional feedback from administrators—elements researchers
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had determined to be necessary in successful incentive programs (Blinder, 1990;
Heneman, 1992; Kennedy et al., 1983; Lawler, 1971; Neal, 2009; Odden & Kelley, 1997,
2002; Podgursky, 2009; Springer, 2009).

Teacher Advancement Program (TAP)
While there had not been an evaluation of the TIF program specifically, the
conclusions drawn in a study of the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) by Springer et
al. (2008) suggested promising results on the effect of teacher incentive programs in
general. TAP, a multi-state performance pay program subsidized by TIF grants, was
developed in 1999 by the Milken Foundation with various pedagogic goals that included
attracting highly-qualified educators, improving teacher effectiveness, and increasing
student achievement. By 2006, the school-wide incentive program was implemented in
over 180 schools in 14 states and the District of Columbia. The authors of the study used
mathematics test score data from nearly 1,200 TAP and non-TAP schools in two states
spanning a four-year period from the 2002 – 2003 to the 2005 – 2006 school years.
The TAP design had four elements: (1) multiple career paths that created
opportunities for professional advancement; (2) on-going targeted professional
development that focused on specific instructional needs; (3) instructionally-focused
accountability through summative and formative student assessments; and (4)
performance-based compensation criteria with detailed student outcomes. According to
the goal-setting and expectancy theories of motivation and the intrinsic and extrinsic
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factors, TAP contained the conditions necessary for both successful teacher participation
and improved student outcomes (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002; Springer, 2009).
To determine the impact of the performance pay program, Springer et al. (2008)
compared school-level student math test score gains in schools that participated in TAP
with school-level student math test score gains in non-TAP schools. Their results
revealed a significant positive TAP-treatment effect on student scores in the grades two
through six, while in the secondary schools the learning gains were only marginally
higher. Furthermore, TAP schools had slightly higher test score gains when compared to
the average test score gains in their respective states. It should be noted that the
mathematics test score data used for their study were not the high-stakes exams on which
the teacher bonuses were based (Springer et al.).

Florida‘s Experience with Performance Pay Programs
The Center for Educator Reform (2007) reported that while President George W.
Bush‘s administration explored establishing a national federal merit pay plan, the Florida
Department of Education (FLDOE) and state legislators required that school districts use
student learning gains and classroom performance evaluations to determine and to reward
highly-effective teachers. As a result, then-Governor Jeb Bush authorized legislative
mandates that ordered all public school districts to propose and to implement their own
teacher performance pay programs by 2003. The state statutes also allowed broad
flexibility in how districts crafted their incentive plans. However, the same report noted
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that the absence of state funding discouraged stakeholder buy-in and precipitated a
hodgepodge of inconsistently designed reward programs with complicated application
requirements and convoluted award criteria. Consequently, a relatively small percentage
of teachers were able to qualify for the performance bonuses (Center for Educator
Compensation Reform).
Many districts designed restrictive bonus pay systems that required teachers to
maneuver through a tedious application process and nearly impossible award targets. For
example, about two-thirds of Florida‘s 67 school districts insisted that teachers submit an
application while a separate two-thirds mandated the submission of instructional
portfolios (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2007). In one district, only
tenured teachers were eligible for the incentive program, in yet another only National
Board Certified Teachers could apply. State education officials and policymakers were
disappointed when only ten or fewer teachers per district received bonuses in the 2005 –
2006 school year from just over half of Florida‘s public school districts (Office of
Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, 2007).
Taking matters into their own hands, undaunted policymakers crafted various
mandatory statewide ―one-size-fits-all‖ performance pay programs for districts to put into
action. By 2008, the Florida Department of Education (2007a, 2009b, 2009d, 2009f)
reported the enactment of three different teacher incentive programs plans: Effectiveness
Compensation (E-Comp), Special Teachers Are Rewarded (STAR), and the Merit Award
Program (MAP). All of these salary reform policies were mandated by state statutes to
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contain four criteria: (1) broad eligibility for all school-based instructional staff and
administrators; (2) teacher-level compensation for individual teachers as opposed to
school-level awards to be shared among the entire faculty; (3) the award was primarily
based on student learning gains and to a lesser degree on teacher performance
evaluations; and (4) the state education commissioner had the authority to ascertain
whether district programs met the state mandates and could deny funding for those that
failed to meet them (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2007; Florida
Department of Education, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009f).

Effectiveness Compensation (E-Comp)
In 2006, Effectiveness Compensation (E-Comp) was provided to LEAs by the
FLDOE to eliminate the multitude of incentive plan models that were being executed
among school districts and to meet the state‘s performance pay requirements (Center for
Educator Compensation Reform, 2007; Florida Department of Education, 2009d). The
cornerstone of this policy was that the amount of freedom given for designing the
performance pay plans was reduced significantly at the district level, thereby ensuring a
uniform statewide approach. There were five key provisions for E-Comp: (1) all
instructional staff were eligible and any application requirements or additional criteria
were prohibited; (2) the measurement of a teacher‘s performance was primarily based on
the learning gains of his/her students via assessment tools approved by the FLDOE; (3)
bonuses worth five percent of a teacher‘s base salary were awarded to at least ten percent
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of teachers in each district; (4) funding was to come from the state legislature—the
education commissioner hoped to receive about $55 million; and (5) the commissioner
would review the compensation plans for all 67 public school districts for proper
compliance (Center for Educator Compensation Reform; Florida Department of
Education, 2009d).
Strong opposition by teachers, district leaders, and teacher unions prevented
statewide adoption of E-Comp. Several elements of the program troubled stakeholders:
the absence of design involvement at the local level—teachers, district leaders, and
unions; too much reliance on the FCAT®—a single measure of student performance; the
proportion of teachers recognized—stakeholders felt the percentage was woefully
inadequate; unrealistic timeline development—districts were given four months to craft a
plan, negotiate it with their unions, and submit it for state approval (Center for Educator
Compensation Reform, 2007).

Special Teachers Are Rewarded (STAR)
On the heels of the failed E-Comp, the Florida Legislature allocated $147.5 million
dollars for the newly created Special Teachers Are Rewarded (STAR) incentive program
(Florida Department of Education, 2009f). After having recognized the unpopular focus
on FCAT® results in the previous performance pay plans, principal evaluations were to be
added to measure teacher performance along with student learning gains, classroom
management, and instructional practices. Also, the timeline for local school boards to
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develop and meet with teachers unions was expanded. Like the E-Comp, all instructional
personnel were eligible for a bonus and included an option for the inclusion of school
administrators. STAR increased the proportion of teachers receiving bonuses from ten
percent to the top 25 percent in each district—hoping to recognize a larger group of
educators (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2007; Florida Department of
Education). The amount of the performance bonus was calculated on five percent of a
teacher‘s base salary for the 2006 – 2007 school year (Orange County Public Schools,
2009b, 2009c). Approval of district incentive plans was made by the state board of
education, shifting the responsibility from the education commissioner (Florida
Department of Education). Despite these policy modifications, only two-thirds of local
school boards agreed to participate in the program, some over the objections of their
teachers.
After only one year of implementation, STAR was dismantled after the 2006 –
2007 school year because—among other issues—it failed to garner widespread support
across the state from teachers, unions, and superintendents. The major objection from
stakeholders was the inconsistent payout amounts (Center for Educator Compensation
Reform, 2007). For instance, a teacher at the lower end of the salary scale could achieve
higher student learning gains while a more experienced counterpart at the upper end of
the scale had students with significantly lower gains. The resulting bonus payout for the
novice teacher would be less than that of the veteran because the award payment would
be calculated on their respective salaries.
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Merit Award Program (MAP)
The Merit Award Program (MAP) was another attempt by the Florida legislature to
implement a statewide teacher performance pay plan. In March of 2007, Governor
Charlie Crist signed into law a bill creating the new incentive pay program to replace
STAR (Florida Department of Education, 2007b). Most of the provisions outlined in the
STAR program were carried over into the MAP plan with a few significant adjustments.
First, school districts were allowed to opt out of participating in the MAP plan provided
local educational agencies (LEAs) were able to design and implement a performance plan
of their own with similar goals and objectives. Second, academic proficiency, which was
a measure of what a student learned, was included as a barometer of student achievement.
The previous plan mandated that student performance was to be based on learning
gains, which required a pre-test and a corresponding posttest. For example, an end-ofcourse Algebra II test would measure the degree of academic proficiency of a secondary
math student whereas the difference in DSS scores from two consecutive years of the
FCAT® Mathematics tests would establish the amount of annual learning gains achieved
(Florida Department of Education, 2009b, 2009c; Orange County Public Schools, 2009a).
Finally, awards for the high performing teachers were to be based on five to ten percent
of the district‘s average teacher‘s salary, unlike STAR where the payout was calculated
on the individual‘s own base salary—which meant different bonus amounts depending on
the teacher‘s length of service within the same district or even within the same school
(Orange County Public Schools).
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Although 53 districts adopted the new performance pay program (Center for
Educator Compensation Reform, 2007), Orange County Public Schools (OCPS), the
source of this dissertation‘s data, did not participate in the 2007 – 2008 school year.
According to a statement posted on the district‘s website in 2009, ―OCPS [was] currently
studying the MAP legislation and its implications‖ (Orange County Public Schools,
2009c). As of the 2009 – 2010 school year, MAP had not been implemented in any
Orange County public school.
Extensive research had shown that goal theory and expectancy theory were integral
motivational components of successful performance pay programs (Blinder, 1990;
Heneman, 1992; Heneman et al., 1989; Kennedy et al., 1983; Lawler, 1971, 1990;
Podgursky, 2009; Springer, 2009; Wanous, et al., 1983; Welbourne & Mejia, 1995). Yet,
in spite of the carefully crafted performance objectives and measurable student outcomes,
the Florida plans failed to ignite widespread teacher buy-in—a critical motivating factor.
Staff members did not believe that they were capable of accomplishing the goals nor did
they consider the inequitable calculation of the bonuses as worthy of their time and effort
(Jacob & Springer, 2008). Legislators and administrators who crafted these salary reform
policies underestimated how the absence of expectancy theory can unravel even the most
well-intentioned initiatives.
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Florida TIF Grantees
In 2007, first year of the TIF grant program, three of Florida‘s largest school
districts were collectively awarded over $12 million: Miami-Dade County Public
Schools, Hillsborough County Public Schools, and Orange County Public Schools (U.S.
Department of Education, 2009c). Similar in scope and design to previous Florida salary
reform policies (E-Comp, STAR, and MAP), the TIF grants were awarded to high-needs
schools as determined by each district‘s criteria for eligibility of participation in the TIF
program.

Miami-Dade County Public Schools
Miami-Dade County Public Schools, located on Florida‘s southeast coast, was the
largest school district in the state and the fourth largest school system in the nation. The
district employed over 22,000 instructors and nearly 1,100 administrators. It served
348,000 students where 59% qualified for free or reduced-price lunch (Florida
Department of Education, 2009e).
Project RISE—Rewards and Incentives for School Educators—was the district‘s
five-year performance pay program funded its first year with a $2.7 million TIF award.
The program was ―designed to increase teacher and principal effectiveness in [36] highneeds schools through incentives and support, which would result in increased student
achievement‖ (Miami-Dade County Public Schools, 2009, p. 1). The cornerstone of this
comprehensive pilot plan was creating a ―climate of change and high expectations
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through learning communities, systems of mentoring, embedded professional
development, and non-instructional planning time‖ (U.S. Department of Education,
2009c, p. 10). Project RISE awards ranged from $2500 to $3000 for teachers and
administrators (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2008).

Hillsborough County Public Schools
Hillsborough County Public Schools, situated on the central west coast, was the
third largest school district in Florida and the eighth largest school system in the nation
(Florida Department of Education, 2009e). Almost 13,000 teachers and 650
administrators served over 193,000 students of whom 48% qualified for free or reducedprice lunch.
POWER—Performance Outcomes with Effective Rewards—was a five-year
performance pay program for teachers and administrators that combined classroom
performance with student achievement. POWER received an initial TIF funding award of
$3 million that ―provide[d] differentiated compensation for teachers and administrators in
[21] high-needs schools‖ (Hillsborough County Public Schools, 2009, p. 1; U.S.
Department of Education, 2009c). The hallmarks of POWER established a reward system
based on increased student learning gains and increased teacher and principal
effectiveness by offering staff development related to skills necessary to reach their
objectives. After the 2007 – 2008 school year, teachers and administrators received
awards of $1096.91 each (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2008).
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Orange County Public Schools
Orange County Public Schools, located in central Florida, was the fourth largest
school district in the state and the tenth largest school system in the nation with over
11,000 instructors and nearly 470 administrators. Forty-seven percent of its 174,000
students benefited from free or reduced-price lunch (American School & University,
2010; Florida Department of Education, 2009e).
Project REAP—Recognizing Excellence in Achievement and Professionalism—
was a five-year performance pay program that rewarded teachers and administrators for
improved student achievement. Orange County‘s (FL) first year TIF award of $6.6
million was used to implement the program in ten high-needs urban Title I secondary
schools located across the district (U.S. Department of Education, 2009c). Project REAP
contained three main components: targeted professional development activities, increased
student achievement scores, and positive final evaluations (Orange County Public
Schools, 2009e). Teachers received bonuses of up to $4000, while administrators
received up to $5000 (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2008).
At first glance, Project REAP embraced the motivation elements necessary for a
successful merit pay program: clearly defined student goals, staff development
opportunities that helped teachers become more effective in the classroom, on-going
administrative support and feedback, and an attractive financial bonus. The TAP
program, which was based on components similar to Project REAP, revealed promising

43

results for incentive programs as student academic achievement improved in its
participating schools (Springer et al., 2008).

Teacher Incentive Fund – Year 1:
Orange County Public Schools Summative Survey Results
During the 2007 – 2008 school year, the first year Orange County Public Schools
participated in the TIF grant, 1,040 administrators and teachers located in the ten Orange
County (FL) Title I secondary schools were eligible to participate in the performance pay
program (U.S. Department of Education, 2007). Of that number, 507 participants
satisfied the pay-out requirements at the end of the school year and received bonuses
totaling $1,956,000; it should be noted that the number of recipients did not reflect the
original number of applicants, some of whom did not meet the pay-out requirements to
receive bonuses. A requirement of the incentive program was for participants—both
instructional staff and administrators—to complete specific professional development
courses. According to a report by the U.S. Department of Education (2007), a total of
$257,754 was spent on various professional development courses designed to target the
instructional needs of low-performing students and were paid for by the TIF grant. The
Summative Survey Results Chart in Appendix C revealed that 429 of the 461 (93%) of
the TIF teachers stated that the TIF professional development courses had a positive
impact on their classroom instruction. In addition, 420 out of the 461 teachers (91%)
found the content of the courses to be relevant and 438 (95%) reported using new
44

strategies learned for the course in their classrooms. The overall satisfaction rate on
professional development indicators was 94% (U.S. Department of Education, 2007).
A goal of the TIF grant was to retain highly effective teachers and principals in
high-needs schools. Information from the TIF Grant Performance Report (see Appendix
D) noted that at the beginning of the 2007 – 2008 school year, 640 of the 905 (71%)
teachers in Orange County Public Schools returned to their teaching positions at the ten
participating TIF schools. However, instructional staff at the TIF schools was reduced by
14% (129 out of 905 teachers) as a result of severe budget cuts by the Florida Legislature
(U.S. Department of Education, 2007). The effects of mandatory staff reductions caused
teacher transfer rates to increase from 3% to 15% and overall teacher retention to drop to
55% (429 out of 776 teachers). The inability to retain highly qualified teachers may have
been the result of budget cuts as opposed to a teacher‘s unwillingness to return to their
schools. On a positive note, at the beginning of the 2007 – 2008 school year, seven of the
ten (70%) principals returned to their positions at the TIF schools; whereas the following
school year, the retention rate had improved to eight out of ten (80%) principals (U.S.
Department of Education, 2007).
In the area of academic achievement, 91% (419 of the 461 teachers) surveyed in the
Summative Survey Results Chart (see Appendix C) believed that their participation in
TIF would have an impact on their students‘ standardized test scores most likely as a
result of their targeted professional development courses (U.S. Department of Education,
2007). For example, on the 2007 FCAT®, TIF schools achieved a mean of 32.35 points in
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mathematics and science. In the overall performance chart in Appendix F, baseline
achievement in mathematics (M = 46.7) was significantly higher than achievement in
science (M = 18). During the first year of the TIF grant, the number of students achieving
at or above grade level increased 4.9 percentage points in mathematics (M = 51.6) and
5.9percentage points in science (M = 23.9) when compared to the scores of the previous
year.
The Florida Department of Education (2010a) published an Annual State Report
Card as a part of Florida‘s School Accountability System (see Appendix E). The School
Accountability System tracked student learning gains based on the state‘s academic
standards from year to year. The system allowed the improvement of individual students
to be tracked from one school year to the next based on FCAT® Development Scale
Scores in reading and mathematics from third through tenth grade (Florida Department of
Education, 2010a). The Annual State Report Card assigned a school grade as determined
by the accumulation of percentage points.
For 2007, the mean average of the total points on the FCAT® by the ten TIF
schools was 435.9 (see Appendix F). The baseline of report card points earned by the
middle schools (M = 453.4) was significantly higher than that of the high schools (M =
395) by nearly 60 points (U.S. Department of Education, 2007). During the first year of
the TIF grant, eight of the ten participating schools increased their performance on the
FCAT® by an average of 27.8 points. On the 2008 FCAT®, the TIF middle schools
earned an average of 482 points, while the TIF high schools earned an average of 421
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points (U.S. Department of Education, 2007). Under Florida‘s accountability system, at
least 525 points were required for an ―A‖ rating (see Appendix E). In 2008, one of the
TIF middle schools received an ―A‖ rating for the first time, having earned 534 points
(U.S. Department of Education).
Previous experiences with Florida‘s teacher incentive programs—E-Comp, STAR,
and MAP—indicated that their failures, in part, were due to a lack of ―buy in‖ from
classroom teachers (Jacob & Springer, 2008). On the other hand, the Year One TIF
Summative Survey Results revealed that 417 of the 461 participants (90%) were
confident that they had a complete understanding of the application process and the
requirements related to the performance pay program (see Appendix C). Ninety-five
percent (437 out of 461 teachers) were glad that their school was a part of the incentive
program, while 91% (419 out of 461) were planning to participate the following year.
One reason for the supportive responses could have been that 434 of the 461 teachers
(94%) acknowledged that the TIF program was often referenced during formal and
informal faculty meetings. Eighty-eight percent, 407 out of 461, of the respondents
thought that the requirements for receiving the TIF incentive award were fair and
equitable.
On a final note, 428 of the 461 teachers (93%) collaborated in learning teams on a
regular basis (see Appendix C). These results contrasted the findings in the survey of
Hillsborough County (FL) teachers conducted by Jacob and Springer (2008), where 56%
(947 out of 1691 respondents) felt that incentive programs created a competitive
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atmosphere which destroyed the ―collaborative culture of teaching.‖ Perhaps the
favorable results of the Orange County program reflected the fact that 423 out of 461
respondents (92%) of the viewed the incentive program as a significant element of the
school improvement plan (U.S. Department of Education, 2007).

Chapter Summary
Teacher pay structures have transformed from providing room and board
supplements during the late 19th century to the single salary schedule used today.
Education leaders have sought to design a pay scale for teachers that recognized their
efforts in the classroom and encouraged others to enter the profession. The 1983 federal
report, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative For Education Reform, concluded that teachers
who demonstrated superior pedagogic skills and knowledge should receive bonuses. The
Teacher Incentive Fund, a federal merit-based compensation policy, was designed by
federal legislators to reward teachers who increased academic achievement among their
low-performing students. Supporters of this salary reform program hoped that offering
financial bonuses would attract and retain high-quality effective educators and close the
achievement gap, especially in high-poverty, high-minority schools.
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CHAPTER THREE:
RESEARCH DESIGN
AND METHODOLOGY
This dissertation focused on an investigation of the impact of a Teacher Incentive
Fund (TIF) grant on low-performing middle school students in one Central Florida school
district during its second year of implementation. This chapter details the research design
and methodology used to analyze the FCAT® Math scores. The topics to be discussed in
this chapter include: the research design, data gathering and sampling procedures,
instrumentation, the research questions, statistical analysis procedures, and ethical
considerations.

Research Design
The quantitative data collected for this study were analyzed using two different
types of research designs. The first research design was a covariance design as the mean
differences of the student scores were analyzed (Lomax, 2007; Marion, 2004). This
design consisted of two groups: students whose teachers participated in the Teacher
Incentive Fund (TIF) and students whose teachers did not participate. The students whose
teachers participated in TIF were considered a treatment group, while the students whose
teachers did not participate were considered a control group. In design notation (see
Table 6), the observations ―O1‖ located below event one were the 2008 FCAT® Math
scores of students whose teachers participated in TIF (TIF Teachers) and the scores of
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students whose teachers did not participate (Non-TIF Teachers). The observations ―O2‖
located below event three were the 2009 FCAT® Math scores of students whose teachers
participated in TIF (TIF Teachers) and the scores of teachers who did not participate in
TIF (Non-TIF Teachers). The ―X‖ located below event two represented the treatment
(e.g. implementation of the TIF program), while the ―blank space‖ located below event
two represented the absence of treatment.

Table 6
Covariance Research Design
EVENT
TIF Teachers
Non-TIF Teachers

1
O1
O1

2
X

3
O2
O2

Note. From Marion, 2004.

The second research design was an ex post facto observational design, which
described trends that existed in the FCAT® Math scores of the ten Title I middle schools
in a Central Florida district from 2005 through 2009 (Rodger, 2004). The independent
variable was used only to classify the Title I middle schools into two groups (Rodger). In
design notation (see Table 7), one group (TIF Middle Schools) represented the seven
Title I middle schools in a Central Florida district that participated in TIF, while the next
group (Non-TIF Middle Schools) represented the three Title I middle schools that were
not eligible to participate. The observations in the diagram labeled as ―O1‖, ―O2‖, ―O3‖,
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―O4‖, and ―O5‖ located under events one, two, three, four, and five; respectively,
represented the FCAT® Math scores over the five-year period.

Table 7
Ex Post Facto Research Design
EVENT
TIF Middle Schools
Non-TIF Middle Schools

1
O1
O1

2
O2
O2

3
O3
O3

4
O4
O4

5
O5
O5

Note. From Marion, 2004.

Data Gathering Procedures
The quantitative data collected for this study were examined to determine the
impact of the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) on increasing academic achievement among
low-performing students in grades six through eight. The measuring of academic
achievement for a low-performing student was based on the amount of learning gains
made by that student from one grade level to the next consecutive grade level (Florida
Department of Education, 2008). Annual learning gains for low-performing students were
based on the difference of the Developmental Scale Scores (DSS) for two consecutive
FCAT® Math exams. A student who met or exceeded the criteria set by the Florida
Department of Education (2008) achieved at least one year‘s academic growth. The
guidelines that determined at least one year‘s academic growth varied according to grade
level.
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The 2008 and 2009 FCAT® Math DSS scores were collected from a Central Florida
middle school—with the consent of the principal and the school district—and were
compared to the criteria in Table 8 to determine the amount of learning gains achieved.
The average learning gain for middle school students was calculated by adding together
the growth definitions for sixth, seventh, and eighth graders, then dividing that sum by
three. Therefore, the average learning gain for middle school students collectively is an
increase of at least 79 points.

Table 8
One Year‘s Growth Definition (Learning Gains) for FCAT® Math DSS
Grade
DSS

4
164

5
119

6
95

7
78

8
64

9
54

10
48

Note. Retained students cannot demonstrate learning gains using DSS. From Florida Department of
Education, 2007b.

In addition to the student scores from the one TIF middle school site, FCAT® Math
test score data from Orange County Public School‘s ten Title I middle schools were
collected for academic years 2005 through 2009. A list of the Title I middle schools was
retrieved from Orange County Public School‘s public website along with information
about the schools eligible to participate in the TIF program (Orange County Public
Schools, 2009e). The ten Title I middle school FCAT® Math test score averages for the
past five years were collected from the Florida Department of Education‘s interactive
public website (Florida Department of Education, 2010b). These scores were analyzed to

52

determine the existence of trends in the data for the two years before TIF (2005 and
2006), the two years after TIF (2008 and 2009); the year of implementation (2007) served
as the baseline.

Data Sampling Procedures
The FCAT® Math DSS scores of students enrolled at one of the Title I middle
schools participating in TIF were an integral component of this study. These scores were
a convenience sample based on the participation of the math teachers in the incentive
program at this middle school. The scores of the students were grouped according to
whether or not their teachers participated in TIF. There were ten math teachers employed
at this particular middle school all of whom were eligible to participate in the incentive
program. Of these ten math teachers, seven participated in TIF while three opted not to
participate. The data were collected and sorted by grade level and math teacher. In order
to protect the identity of the students, all identifying information was removed, such as
student names and identification numbers, and replaced with an alphanumeric code.
The student database began with 1047 scores. After removing 97 scores of students
who did not have 2008 FCAT® Math DSS results to pair with 2009 FCAT® Math DSS
scores, there was a subtotal of 950. Next, students who scored at a FCAT® Level 3 or
above were excluded. Since there were 460 students who reached this achievement,
removing them from the database resulted in a final sample size of 490. In order to
calculate annual learning gains per the Florida Department of Education guidelines, only
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DSS scores from students who scored at FCAT® Level 1 or Level 2 were analyzed. The
sample was limited to the scores of low-performing students that had both 2008 and 2009
FCAT® Math DSS results. For the seven math teachers who participated in TIF, 358 of
their students met these criteria, whereas for the three math teachers who opted out of
participating, 132 of their students met these requirements.

Instrumentation
The dependent variable for the covariance research design was the FCAT® Math
DSS student scores. The student scores were an interval measurement as the distances
between the points on the scale were equal across the scale (Lomax, 2007). The
independent variable was the math teachers, who were divided into two groups: teachers
who participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) and teachers who did not
participate in the incentive program. Their participation in TIF was the grouping variable.
The control group, teachers who did not participate in TIF, were coded in the procedure
using a TIF status = 0. The treatment group, the teachers participating in TIF, were coded
in the procedure using a TIF status = 1.
The dependent variable for the ex post facto descriptive research design was the
FCAT® Math DSS Title I middle school scores. In a manner similar to the student scores,
the middle school scores were an interval measurement as well. For this research design,
no independent variable was manipulated. The scores were grouped according to the
middle school‘s eligibility to participate in the TIF program.
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Research Questions
To solidify his commitment to education reform, President Obama‘s economic
stimulus policy, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA),
earmarked over $687 million taxpayer dollars in funding for performance pay initiatives
(Chait & Miller, 2009a, 2009b). Moreover, the $4.35 billion Race to the Top fund
provided competitive federal grants that championed school reform policies (U.S.
Department of Education, 2010). Race to the Top awarded comprehensive state education
programs that were implementing innovative initiatives that focused on recruiting and
rewarding effective teachers and administrators in high-needs schools that increased
academic achievement. The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grant, initiated under the
George W. Bush Administration with continued support of the Obama Administration,
was designed to improve academic achievement among low-performing students (U.S.
Department of Education, 2009b, 2010). Therefore, the four research questions of this
study focused on the standardized test results of academically struggling students in a
Central Florida school district that was in the second year of a TIF grant:
1. What differences in learning gains existed, if any, between the 2008 and 2009
Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® Math scores among the students of
math teachers at one urban Central Florida Title I middle school who
participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund when compared to the students of
math teachers who did not participate?
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2. What trends in the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® Math scores
from 2005 through 2009 existed, if any, among the Title I middle schools in
one Central Florida school district that participated in the Teacher Incentive
Fund?
3. What trends in the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® Math scores
from 2005 through 2009 existed, if any, among the Title I middle schools in
one Central Florida school district that did not participate in the Teacher
Incentive Fund?
4. What trends in the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® Math scores
from 2005 through 2009 existed, if any, between the two groups when
compared to each other?

Statistical Analysis Procedures
An independent-samples t test was conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that
differences existed between the 2008 and 2009 Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test®
Math scores among the students of math teachers at one urban Central Florida Title I
middle school based on their teachers‘ participation in the Teacher Incentive Fund. The
independent-samples t test was the statistical procedure chosen to analyze the 2008 and
2009 FCAT® Math DSS scores of the students because the two groups of math teachers
were independent of each other—the scores of their students had no relationship to one
another—and the scores were assumed to be normally distributed in each of the two
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groups (Lomax, 2007). Referencing the covariance research design, the scores of the
students were grouped by math teachers who participated in TIF—the treatment group
(―TIF Teachers‖) and the teachers who did not participate—the control group (―Non-TIF
Teachers‖). The mean scores of the treatment group were compared to the control group
to determine the existence of any differences in the average learning gain based on the
growth definition.
The Development Scale Scores (DSS) from all of ten of the Title I middle schools
in a Central Florida district were displayed in ten separate line graphs to show any
changes over time in the scores from the FCAT® Math tests administered from 2005
through 2009 (Lomax, 2007). In reference to the ex post facto research design, there were
five observations of the scores where each observation corresponded to the years 2005,
2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. Trends that existed in the TIF middle schools that
participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund were compared to trends that existed in the
TIF middle schools not eligible to participate. The observations from these line graphs
were the basis for the final conclusions.

Ethical Considerations
The ethical considerations regarding the student data gathered for this study were a
moderate concern. The student data had all identifying characteristics removed prior to
analysis. Also, any of the information published in tables within this study had all
identifying characteristics removed. Written permission for the gathering of all student
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data used in this study was granted by both the principal of the TIF Title I middle school
and the research director for a Central Florida public school district.

Chapter Summary
An independent-samples t test was chosen to expose any differences in learning
gains that existed between the 2008 and 2009 Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test®
Math scores among math teachers who participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund when
compared to math teachers who did not participate. Moreover, the data collected from ten
Central Florida Title I middle schools were organized into separate line graphs that
displayed any trends in learning gains over a five-year period. The topics discussed in
this chapter included: the research design, data gathering and sampling procedures,
instrumentation, the research questions, statistical analysis procedures, and ethical
considerations. The results of these procedures will be analyzed to determine the
academic impact of a Teacher Incentive Fund grant during its second year of
implementation on low-performing middle school students in a Central Florida school
district.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
RESULTS
The purpose of this dissertation was to determine if any differences in learning
gains existed between the 2008 and 2009 Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test®
(FCAT®) Math scores among the students of math teachers at one urban Central Florida
Title I middle school who participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) when
compared to the students of math teachers who did not participate. Furthermore, the study
analyzed FCAT® Math scores from 2005 through 2009 in one Central Florida school
district to determine if any trends existed: among the Title I middle schools participating
in TIF; among the Title I middle schools that did not participate; and between the two
groups when compared to each other.
Chapter Four begins with the results of the independent-samples t tests, which
analyzed the scores of the students from the Title I middle school. The chapter ends with
observations of the line graphs of the five-year data gathered from the ten Title I middle
schools.

Independent-Samples t Test Results
An independent-samples t test was conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that
differences existed between the 2008 and 2009 Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test®
Math scores among the students of math teachers at one urban Central Florida Title I
middle school based on their teachers‘ participation in the Teacher Incentive Fund. The
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mean scores of the treatment group (TIF Teachers) and the control group (Non-TIF
Teachers) were compared for any differences in the amount of learning gains achieved.
According to the results in Table 9, Levene‘s test for equal variance, a measure of the
dispersion of a set of data points around their mean value, shows that the homogeneity of
variance assumption was satisfied (F = 2.003, p = .158).

Table 9
Independent-Samples t Test: Levene‘s Test for Equality of Variances

Equal Variances
Assumed
Not Assumed

Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
F
Sig.
2.003
0.158

t-test for Equality of Means
t
1.49
1.43

df
488
217.04

Sig. (2-tailed)
0.14
0.16

Figure 1 illustrates the dispersion of the student data grouped by their math
teachers‘ participation in the Teacher Incentive Fund. The graphs of both the treatment
group (TIF Teachers) and the control group (Non-TIF Teachers) reveal a normal
distribution of the data sets.
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Figure 1. Dispersion of Student FCAT® Math Scores

Table 10 shows that students whose math teachers did not participate in TIF were
defined as a ―0‖ on the control grouping variable (Non-TIF Teachers), and students
whose math teachers did participate were defined as a ―1‖ on the treatment grouping
variable (TIF Teachers). The mean scores of the TIF teachers (M = 100.97, SD =
198.83) and the non-TIF teachers (M = 131.80, SD = 216.98) were used to calculate the
mean difference. The mean difference of the test scores, 30.83, was obtained by
subtracting the mean scores of the TIF teachers from the mean scores of the non-TIF
teachers (see Table 11). The 95% confidence interval for the difference in means was
wide, ranging from -9.96 to 71.61.
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Table 10
Independent-Samples t Test: Group Statistics
Grouping
Group
Variable
0
Non-TIF Teachers
1
TIF Teachers

N

Mean

SD

132
358

131.80
100.97

216.98
198.83

Std. Error
Mean
18.89
10.51

Table 11
Independent-Samples t Test: t-test for Equality of Means

Equal Variances
Assumed
Not Assumed

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Interval
Mean
Std. Error
of the Difference
Difference
Difference
Lower
Upper
30.83
20.76
-9.96
71.61
30.83
21.61
-11.77
73.42

Although, students whose math teachers participated in TIF (M = 101.0, SD =
198.83) had lower mean scores than students whose math teachers who did not
participate (M = 131.8, SD = 216.98), the results of the independent-samples t test
revealed that there was no statistical difference between the two groups based on
participation in TIF, t(488) = 1.49, p > .05 (see Table 9). The eta squared index indicated
that less than 1% of the variance of the test score variable was accounted for by whether a
teacher participated in TIF.
As shown in Table 12, when the mean difference of the students was separated by
individual math teacher, the mean difference of three of the seven math teachers that
participated in TIF exceeded the average learning gain for middle school students of 79
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points. The mean scores of each of the math teachers who did not participate exceeded
the average learning gain for middle school students (see Table 13).

Table 12
TIF Teacher FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
Variable
TIF Teacher A
TIF Teacher B
TIF Teacher C
TIF Teacher D
TIF Teacher E
TIF Teacher F
TIF Teacher G
Total

2009 TIF Scores
N
M
SD
5
1012.8 252.3
89 1628.9 180.4
78 1461.5 260.5
52 1448.9 217.9
45 1654.6 157.0
47 1786.6 102.2
42 1431.1 219.7
358 1558.4 243.3

2008 TIF Scores
N
M
SD
5
961.2
405.0
89 1492.6 229.4
78 1427.1 200.0
52 1382.3 203.9
45 1457.9 210.1
47 1651.4 102.9
42 1373.8 236.6
358 1457.4 230.6

Mean
Difference
52.6
136.3
34.4
66.6
196.7
135.2
57.3
101.0

Table 13
Non-TIF Teacher FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
Variable
Non-TIF
Teacher H
Non-TIF
Teacher I
Non-TIF
Teacher J
Total

2009 non-TIF Scores
N
M
SD

2008 non-TIF Scores
N
M
SD

Mean
Difference

70

1574.4

295.5

70

1466.3

289.2

108.1

12

1391.6

226.6

12

1227.4

242.5

164.2

50

1619.1

170.1

50

1462.0

178.4

157.2

132

1574.7

254.8

132

1443.0

256.1

131.8

The grade-level student mean scores, as shown in Tables 14 and 15, show that both
groups of sixth graders—students whose teachers participated in TIF (M = 49.0) and
students whose teachers did not participate (M = -63.8) did not make at least one year‘s
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learning gain (see Table 16). When compared to the 2008 FCAT® Math test, sixth grade
students whose teachers did not participate in TIF scored lower on the 2009 FCAT® Math
test. Students in seventh and eighth grades exceeded Florida‘s guidelines for learning
gains for each grade level; 78 and 64 points, respectively (see Table 16). Seventh grade
students whose teachers did not participate in TIF (M = 195.5) had a slightly higher score
than seventh grade students whose teachers participated (M = 189.9). On the other hand,
eighth graders whose teachers participated in TIF (M = 105.0) demonstrated higher
learning gains than eighth graders whose teachers did not (M = 82.1).

Table 14
Grade Level FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores: TIF Teachers

Grade
6
7
8
Total

2009 TIF Scores
N
M
SD
176 1437.1
248.6
99
1621.7
171.8
83
1740.1
144.1
358 1558.4
243.3

2008 TIF Scores
N
M
SD
176 1388.1
229.2
99
1431.8
229.5
83
1635.1
115.5
358 1457.4
230.6

Mean
Difference
49.0
189.9
105.0
101.0

Table 15
Grade Level FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores: Non-TIF Teachers

Grade
6
7
8
Total

2009 Non-TIF Scores
N
M
SD
11
1025.1
244.5
72
1579.4
190
49
1691.2
168.2
132 1574.7
254.8

2008 Non-TIF Scores
N
M
SD
11
1088.9
268.2
72
1383.9
228.8
49
1609.1
156.1
132 1442.9
256.1

64

Mean
Difference
-63.8
195.5
82.1
131.8

Table 16
One Year‘s Growth Definition (Learning Gains) for FCAT® Math DSS
Grade
DSS

4
164

5
119

6
95

7
78

8
64

9
54

10
48

Note. Retained students cannot demonstrate learning gains using DSS. From Florida Department of
Education, 2007b.

Data Tables and Line Graphs Observations
The next phase of the study involved analyzing the mean FCAT® Math scores from
2005 through 2009 of the ten Title I middle schools in this Central Florida school district
to describe any trends that existed among schools that participated in TIF and those that
did not. All Developmental Scale Scores (DSS) were retrieved from the Florida
Department of Education‘s FCAT® interactive website, and information was displayed in
tables and line graphs for interpretation and comparisons. (Florida Department of
Education, 2010b). The seven Title I middle schools that participated in TIF were
analyzed first; then the three Title I middle schools that did not participate were analyzed.
Observations of the ten Title I middle schools described any trends that existed over the
five-year period. Next observations of any trends during the two years TIF was
implemented at the middle schools were documented. Both groups of middle schools
were assigned an alphanumeric code that distinguished them from their eligibility to
participate in the TIF grant.
In Table 17 and Figure 2, the scores of TIF MS – 01 revealed increased DSS scores
across all grade levels over the five-year period where eighth grade had the largest point
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gain of 51 points. Sixth grade scores increased 33 points and seventh grade scores were
higher by 8 points. The most notable increase occurred among the sixth graders after the
second year of the TIF grant, when scores increased 70 points after two years of declines.
During that same time period, scores decreased in the seventh and eighth grades by 30
and 25 points, respectively. Two years after the implementation of TIF, sixth grade (by
46 points) and eighth grade (by 19 points) scores were higher whereas seventh grade
scores were lower (by 11 points).

Table 17
TIF MS – 01: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

6
7
8

FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1510 1527 1497 1473 1543
1674 1696 1693 1712 1682
1731 1791 1763 1807 1782

Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b.
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2006
17
22
60

Learning Gains
2007 2008
-30
-24
-3
19
-28
44

2009
70
-30
-25

Figure 2. TIF MS – 01: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

In Table 18 and Figure 3, the scores of TIF MS – 02 revealed increased DSS scores
across all grade levels over the five-year period where eighth grade had the largest gains
of 69 points. Seventh grade scores were 48 points higher followed by sixth graders whose
scores increased 45 points. Eighth grade scores increased 44 points after the first year of
the TIF grant; however, the scores made a slight decrease of just 2 points after the second
year. Seventh grade scores were relatively flat after two years in TIF as the mean score
remained the same in 2007 and 2009. Sixth grade scores showed no change after the first
year of TIF, but increased 16 points after the second year.
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Table 18
TIF MS – 02: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

6
7
8

FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1566 1618 1595 1595 1611
1713 1699 1761 1768 1761
1802 1810 1829 1873 1871

2006
52
-14
8

Learning Gains
2007 2008
-23
0
62
7
19
44

2009
16
-7
-2

Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b.

Figure 3. TIF MS – 02: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

In Table 19 and Figure 4, the scores of TIF MS – 03 revealed increased DSS scores
across all grade levels over the five-year period. Eighth grade scores had the largest gains
at 131 points, followed by sixth grade (124 points) and seventh grade (120 points). Two
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years after the implementation of TIF, sixth grade (85 points) scored the highest learning
gains with eighth grade scores at 68 points higher. On the other hand, seventh grade
scores were slightly lower (1 point) at the end of the second year of TIF. Sixth grade
scores showed a steady year-over-year increase during the five-year period with an
especially steep gain of 55 points after the second year of TIF.

Table 19
TIF MS – 03: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

6
7
8

FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1502 1527 1541 1571 1626
1618 1676 1739 1776 1738
1730 1779 1773 1844 1841

Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b.

69

2006
25
58
49

Learning Gains
2007 2008
14
30
63
37
-6
71

2009
55
-38
-3

Figure 4. TIF MS – 03: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

In Table 20 and Figure 5, the scores of TIF MS – 04 revealed increased DSS scores
in sixth and seventh grade scores (10 points and 34 points, respectively) over the fiveyear period. However, eighth grade scores decreased 14 points during that same time.
Two years after TIF, sixth grade scores had the highest gains at 38 points while seventh
grade increased a modest three points. Eighth grade scores decreased 23 points, after two
years in TIF; most notably dropping 45 points at the end of the second year in TIF.
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Table 20
TIF MS – 04: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

6
7
8

FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1443 1472 1415 1461 1453
1579 1634 1610 1598 1613
1704 1701 1713 1735 1690

2006
29
55
-3

Learning Gains
2007 2008
-57
46
-24
-12
12
22

2009
-8
15
-45

Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b.

Figure 5. TIF MS – 04: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

In Table 21 and Figure 6, the scores of TIF MS – 05 revealed increased DSS scores
across all grade levels over the five-year period. Sixth grade scores had the highest
learning gains with 35 points, while seventh grade (one point) and eighth grade (nine
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points) scored modest increases. Two years after implementing TIF, sixth grade had the
most dramatic increase at 126 points. On the other hand, the scores of the remaining
grades decreased; seventh grade went down 39 points and eighth grade went down 22
points during the same period. The year before the TIF grant, sixth grade scores dropped
significantly by 107 points, then increased at a steady rate during the two years after the
incentive program was implemented, with 78 point gains the first year and 48 point gains
the second year.

Table 21
TIF MS – 05: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

6
7
8

FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1575 1591 1484 1562 1610
1704 1718 1744 1743 1705
1790 1797 1821 1819 1799

Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b.
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2006
16
14
7

Learning Gains
2007 2008
-107
78
26
-1
24
-2

2009
48
-38
-20

Figure 6. TIF MS – 05: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

In Table 22 and Figure 7, the scores of TIF MS – 06 revealed increased DSS scores
in seventh grade (46 points) and eighth grade (35 points) over the five-year period
whereas sixth grade scores had decreased 40 points. Two years after implementing TIF,
seventh grade and eighth grade scores were higher by 38 points and 25 points,
respectively. Sixth grade scores had decreased by 30 points after two years in the TIF
program. After the second year of TIF, all grade levels exhibited decreased scores, with
sixth grade scores having shown the deepest decline at 37 points. Eighth grade scores
dropped 26 points, while seventh grade had the smallest decrease at just one point.
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Table 22
TIF MS – 06: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

6
7
8

FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1578 1586 1568 1575 1538
1729 1709 1737 1776 1775
1808 1831 1818 1869 1843

2006
8
-20
23

Learning Gains
2007 2008
-18
7
28
39
-13
51

2009
-37
-1
-26

Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b.

Figure 7. TIF MS – 06: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
In Table 23 and Figure 8, the scores of TIF MS – 07 revealed increased DSS scores
in eighth grade (57 points) and sixth grade (7 points) over the five-year period unlike
seventh grade scores that had decreased 21 points. During the two years of the TIF grant,
only eighth grade scores illustrated a gain of six points; sixth grade scores decreased
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slightly by four points, while seventh grade scores dropped 22 points. After the second
year of the TIF grant, seventh grade scores declined 65 points.

Table 23
TIF MS – 07: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

6
7
8

FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1532 1506 1543 1536 1539
1695 1682 1696 1739 1674
1744 1768 1795 1808 1801

2006
-26
-13
24

Learning Gains
2007 2008
37
-7
14
43
27
13

Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b.

Figure 8. TIF MS – 07: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
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2009
3
-65
-7

The last three sets of graphic displays were of the data retrieved from the Title I
middle schools in the Central Florida district that were not eligible to participate in the
TIF program. In Table 24 and Figure 9, the scores of Non-TIF MS – 08 revealed
increased DSS scores across all grade levels over the five-year period; both sixth grade
(37 points) and eighth grade (38 points) showed growth, whereas seventh grade (76
points) demonstrated the most dramatic increase of all the grade levels. Two years after
the implementation of the TIF program in the district, all grade levels maintained
increased scores, however, sixth grade (45 points) had the highest scores followed by
seventh grade (29 points), then eighth grade at six points. Sixth grade showed the
greatest increase of all grades after the first year of the TIF grant with learning gains of
47 points.

Table 24
Non-TIF MS – 08: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

6
7
8

FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1559 1541 1548 1595 1593
1666 1721 1713 1704 1742
1761 1784 1793 1828 1799

Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b.

76

2006
-18
55
23

Learning Gains
2007 2008
7
47
-8
-9
9
35

2009
-2
38
-29

Figure 9. Non-TIF MS – 08: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

In Table 25 and Figure 10, Non-TIF MS – 09 revealed a modest increase in DSS
scores in eighth grade (8 points) scores over the five-year period. On the other hand, both
seventh grade and sixth grade scores decreased by 41 points and 37 points, respectively.
However, the two years the TIF grant was implemented elsewhere in the district, there
were increased scores across all grade levels. Sixth grade had the highest gains at 37
points with eighth grade scores improving by 26 points. Seventh grade scores increased a
slight two points. Seventh grade had the widest fluctuation during that two-year
timeframe. The first year after the TIF program, seventh grade scores increased 52
points, whereas after the second year, their scores decreased by 50 points.
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Table 25
Non-TIF MS – 09: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

6
7
8

FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1627 1582 1553 1594 1590
1773 1728 1730 1782 1732
1842 1845 1824 1867 1850

2006
-45
-45
3

Learning Gains
2007 2008
-29
41
2
52
-21
43

2009
-4
-50
-17

Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b.

Figure 10. Non-TIF MS – 09: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

In Table 26 and Figure 11, Non-TIF MS – 10 revealed a modest increase in DSS
scores in seventh grade (seven points) scores over the five-year period as sixth grade and
eighth grades showed decreased scores by eight points and 20 points, respectively.
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During the two years TIF was implemented elsewhere in the district, the scores increased
across all grade levels with seventh grade improving the greatest by 27 points, followed
by sixth grade with 14 points and eighth grade with nine points. Seventh grade (44
points) scores showed the largest gains of all grade levels as the TIF grant was
implemented in the district for the first time during the 2007 – 2008 school year.

Table 26
Non-TIF MS – 10: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

6
7
8

FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1605 1558 1583 1605 1597
1745 1710 1725 1769 1752
1854 1816 1825 1821 1834

Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b.
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2006
-47
-35
-38

Learning Gains
2007 2008
25
22
15
44
9
-4

2009
-8
-17
13

Figure 11. Non-TIF MS – 10: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores

Table 27 and Figure 12 illustrate the average DSS scores of the seven Title I middle
schools participating in TIF and the three Title I middle schools not eligible to
participate. Both groups showed their largest gains (TIF group at 27 points and non-TIF
at 23 points) after the first year of the TIF grant, yet both registered a small drop in scores
after the second year. At the end of the five-year period, the TIF group scores increased
by a wider margin when compared to the non-TIF group; the TIF schools increased
overall by 35 points whereas the non-TIF grew by 6 points.
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Table 27
TIF v. Non-TIF Middle Schools: 2005 – 2009 FCAT® Math DSS Scores

Non-TIF
TIF

FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1744 1729 1730 1757 1750
1670 1687 1688 1711 1705

Learning Gains
2006 2007 2008 2009
-15
1
27
-7
17
1
23
-6

Figure 12. TIF v. Non-TIF Middle Schools: 2005 – 2009 FCAT® Math DSS Scores

Chapter Summary
Independent-samples t tests were conducted to determine if any differences in
learning gains existed between the 2008 and 2009 FCAT® Math scores among students of
math teachers a one Central Florida middle school during the second year of a Teacher
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Incentive Fund (TIF) grant. The results of these tests determined that there was no
statistical difference between the Math scores of the teachers who participated in TIF and
teachers who did not participate. The mean scores of the treatment group and the control
group revealed that learning gains were achieved among both groups. The 2005 through
2009 FCAT® Math scores of ten Title I middle schools were displayed in tables and
figures after which observations of any trends were described. The observations of these
middle schools yielded inconsistent data trends. The Title I middle schools that
participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) had shown increased math scores over
the five-year period as did the middle schools that were not eligible to participate over the
same period. At the end of the five-year period, TIF participating scores increased by a
wider margin when compared to the non-TIF eligible schools. The results of these
statistical procedures analyzed the academic impact of a TIF grant on middle school
students who were performing below grade level in this Central Florida school district.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSIONS,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) was a five-year federal performance pay
competitive grant program that supplemented the salary of highly effective teachers with
financial recognition based on their students‘ standardized test scores. Seven Title I
middle schools in a Central Florida district were eligible to implement TIF during the
2007 – 2008 school year. Participating teachers were qualified to receive bonuses based
on how well their students scored on the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test®
(FCAT®).
This chapter begins with demographic profiles of the urban Title I middle school
and the ten Title I middle schools and conclusions by this researcher. The chapter
continues with a discussion of the learning gains of the students of math teachers who
participated in TIF and the learning gains of the students of math teachers who did not
participate. In addition, any trends observed in the five-year FCAT® Developmental Scale
Scores (DSS) among the seven Title I middle schools of the Central Florida school
district participating in TIF will be discussed; any trends observed among the three Title I
middle schools that did not participate will be discussed; and any trends observed
between the two groups when compared to each other will be discussed. The chapter
ends with recommendations for additional research on teacher performance pay
programs.
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Demographic Profile: Title I Middle School
The urban Title I middle school, whose student scores were analyzed in this study
received an annual state report card grade of ―C‖ at the end of the 2008 – 2009 school
year based on its 2009 FCAT® scores. This middle school served nearly 1000 students in
its Central Florida community for over thirty years. The student population reflected the
culturally diverse neighborhood of its residents. The ethnicity of the student body was
comprised of 49% Black, 41% Hispanic, 4% White, 4% Asian/Pacific Islanders, 1%
Multiracial, and 1% American Indian/Eskimo. Eighty-nine percent of the students were
eligible for free or reduced price lunch. The average daily attendance rate was 93% for
the 2008 – 2009 school year. Student mobility rate was 50% during the 2009 – 2010
school year. The student demographic information for the profile of this middle school
was retrieved from its 2009 – 2010 School Improvement Plan (Orange County Public
Schools, 2010a).
The instructional staff included 61 teachers and three administrators with an ethnic
distribution of 46% Caucasian, 37% African-American, 16% Hispanic and 1% other.
Twelve percent of the teachers had Master‘s degrees, while the average number of
teaching experience was 7.8 years (Florida Department of Education, 2009e).

Demographic Profile: Ten Title I Middle Schools
There were a total of 34 middle schools in this Central Florida district; ten of which
were designated as Title I schools. These schools served about 10,000 of the 36,690
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students in grades six through eight. As of the 2009 – 2010 school year, between 76% to
91% of the students attending these schools received free or reduced price lunch; higher
than the poverty average for this Central Florida district of 58% (Orange County Public
Schools, 2009f).
The beginning teacher‘s salary in this district was $37,000. The district‘s average
teacher‘s salary was $44,790. Teachers with advanced degrees received a supplement of
$2605 for a master‘s, $3993 for a specialist, and $5267 for a doctorate (Orange County
Public Schools, 2010b). Collectively, these Title I middle schools employed nearly 600
teachers and administrators of whom 21% held advanced degrees. The district average
for advanced degrees was 40%. The average teaching experience in these middle schools
was 8.3 years whereas the average for the district was 10.9 years (Florida Department of
Education, 2009e).

Limitations
The school-wide DSS scores analyzed in this study included FCAT® Level 3, 4,
and 5 students, whereas the analysis of the student DSS scores were limited to FCAT®
Level 1s and 2s in order to calculate learning gains. Displaying the school-level data in
tables and graphs illustrated the existence of any trends among all students over the fiveyear time period as opposed to the amount of learning gains achieved among lowperforming students. The inclusion of upper level students (i.e., demonstrating skills
and/or knowledge on or above grade level) may have overshadowed the extent of the
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actual learning gains of the low-performing students, who were the intended targets of the
Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) program.

Conclusion
The conclusion of this researcher was that the teacher incentive program
implemented in a Central Florida district had a positive impact on the learning gains of
low-performing middle school students. As evidenced in this study, students of the math
teachers who participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) demonstrated at least one
year‘s academic growth. These student-level results were similar to the higher learning
gains found in the research conducted by Springer et al. (2008) on the Teacher
Advancement Program (TAP), a multi-state performance pay program subsidized by TIF
grants. School-based scores reviewed in the TAP study uncovered that the standardized
test results of schools participating in the performance pay program increased when
compared to previous years. Springer et al. did not use the high-stakes standardized
exams on which the teacher bonuses in the TAP program were based. The student
FCAT® Math scores used in this study were retrieved from the same middle school
database used to calculate the learning gains for TIF bonuses. Based on the finding in this
study, the TIF program implemented at an urban Central Florida middle school met its
primary goal to reward highly effective math teachers who participated in the program
and increased student standardized test scores.
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Students of math teachers who did not participate in TIF had learning gains as well
at the urban middle school. Unfortunately, they did not receive financial recognition for
their efforts. These highly effective teachers should be encouraged to partake in future
initiatives that recognize their students‘ academic success.
According to the statistical evidence presented in this study, there was no
difference in student scores based on a teacher‘s participation in TIF. On average, test
scores increased at this middle school for both groups (TIF teachers v. non-TIF teachers)
during the TIF program, however, upon closer inspection the mean scores of sixth grade
teachers noted the failure to exceed at least one year‘s growth for both groups. Clearly, a
comprehensive review of the curriculum and instructional strategies for this grade level
are warranted to better understand where adjustments should be implemented.
The impact of TIF at the ten Title I middle schools was inconsistent. During the
two years before introducing the performance pay program in the seven TIF-eligible Title
I middle schools, 100% of both seventh and eighth graders had higher Developmental
Scale Scores (DSS); for the sixth graders only three of the seven (43%) middle schools
had higher DSS scores. During the same two years, in the three Title I middle schools
that were not eligible to participate, two schools had lower DSS scores across all grade
levels. During the two years after TIF was implemented, the sixth graders in five of the
seven (71%) TIF-eligible middle schools had higher DSS scores. The seventh graders in
two of the seven (29%) schools had higher scores. Eighth graders fared better as five of
the seven (71%) schools had higher scores. Observations of the seven middle schools that
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were eligible to participate in TIF revealed no consistent impact, positive or negative, of
the incentive program on student test scores.
Observations of the three Title I middle schools that were not eligible to participate
in TIF exposed more definitive trends when compared to the TIF-eligible middle schools.
Two years after TIF was implemented in the other Title I middle schools, two of the three
TIF-ineligible Title I middle schools had higher DSS scores across all three grade levels.
The other ineligible middle schools had higher DSS scores in sixth and seventh grade.
FCAT® Math scores of the three TIF-ineligible Title I middle schools were higher after
the incentive program was implemented at the seven TIF-eligible Title I middle schools.
The seven Title I middle schools that participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund
(TIF) had shown increased math scores over the five-year period as did the middle
schools that were not eligible to participate over the same period. During four of the five
years observed, the scores revealed consistent upward trending in data as both groups of
middle schools had increased mean scores. At the end of the five-year period, TIF
participating scores increased by a wider margin (35 points) when compared to the nonTIF eligible schools (6 points). The higher test scores of both groups may be a reflection
of the current era of accountability in education as improving the academic needs of lowperforming students drive curricular, instructional, and funding decisions. These
observations highlight that teachers who dedicate themselves to demand academic
excellence for their students in high-needs schools will achieve success regardless of the
presence of a financial reward system.
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Discussion

Santibañez et al. (2007) and Springer et al. (2008) reported higher scores from
students whose teachers participated in an incentive program. Moreover, the research of
Lavy (2002) and Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2008) also documented that student
test scores increased when teachers were offered performance bonuses. The findings in
this dissertation support the work of these authors as the test scores of the students whose
teachers participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) revealed that learning gains had
occurred. In addition, this researcher discovered also that teachers at one urban Central
Florida middle school who chose not to participate in TIF also had increased student test
scores. The independent-samples tests noted that while there was no statistical difference
between the two groups, mean scores had increased among the groups. Participation in
TIF was not shown to be a statistical factor in whether or not students test scores would
improved. Teachers who participated in TIF and had students whose scores increased
received bonuses and thus were rewarded for their successful efforts.
The implementation of TIF at the urban middle school created a climate that
focused attention on the academic achievement of low-performing students as TIF
bonuses were based on improved FCAT® Test scores among this particular group. As a
result, a teacher‘s day-to-day classroom decisions, e.g. what to teach and how to teach it,
were based on knowing their students‘ skills and abilities. I believe that using student
data to drive instruction, improves a teachers ability to help differentiate his/her lessons
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to maximize diverse student understanding. When this instructional technique is utilized
effectively, teachers will achieve higher levels of success for their students.
My research has shown that math test scores increased at seven Title I middle
schools two years after teachers began participating in TIF. At the three TIF-ineligible
middle schools, test scores had increased during the two years TIF was implemented at
the other schools. These discoveries challenged the literature concerning the large
number of inexperienced teachers employed in high-needs schools (Aaronson, Barrow, &
Sander, 2007; Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2006; Podgursky, 2009;
Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005). The consensus of the authors was that high-needs
schools had a disproportionate number of inexperienced teachers, which translated into
smaller learning gains among their students. Yet, the evidence presented in this study
countered their conclusions. The data-driven instructional decisions may have attributed
to the improved test scores among these schools along with the financial support of the
federal government through educational funding programs that specifically target highneeds schools. Part of the requirements of participating in the TIF program was that
teachers attend professional development which focused on the academic challenges of
low-performing students. Quality collaboration with other teachers (as noted in the
OCPS Year 1 TIF Summative Survey), when combined with data-driven instruction,
targeted professional development, and additional resources will provide the framework
of activities needed for improving student learning.
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Goodlad (1984) cited that a major reason teachers entered the profession was the
satisfaction of working with children. Perhaps, the highly effective—albeit
―inexperienced‖ teachers—were motivated by their individual personal satisfaction and
dedication to their craft rather than extrinsic financial rewards.

Policy Development: Race to the Top
The U.S. Department of Education‘s Race to the Top provided $4.35 billion dollars
in competitive grants that supports education reform across four key areas: preparing
students to succeed in college and the workplace, building data systems for student
progress and instructional decisions, linking teacher pay to student success, and
improving lowest performing schools (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). Florida
was one of 40 states and the District of Columbia that applied for the grants and was one
of the sixteen declared as first-round finalists by the U.S. Department of Education. In
May, 2010, the phase one winners and their awards were announced: Delaware ($100
million) and Tennessee ($500 million). Their funding was scheduled for allocation for
over a period of four years. Although Florida missed out on the first round of payouts,
phase two awards are scheduled for announcement in June 2010. U.S. Education
Secretary Arne Duncan hoped to award between ten to fifteen grants across the country.
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Policy Implications: Florida‘s Proposed Merit Pay Plan
In April of 2010, House bill 7189 and Senate Bill 6 – Education Personnel reached
the desk of Florida Governor Charlie Crist. The major items in this education reform bill,
which would take effect July 1st, 2010 if signed into law, would eliminate automatic
raises based on teaching experience or education degrees earned, require more than 50%
of a teacher‘s evaluation to be based on student learning gains, create a performance fund
for instructional personnel and school-based administrators, and would be phased in over
three years (Florida House of Representatives, 2010).
There was significant opposition by teachers and teachers‘ union regarding this
merit plan. Many protestors were extremely concerned with linking their salary to their
student‘s success on an annual test. The findings in my research should put to rest some
of their fears. Learning gains are attainable as evidenced by the increased mean scores of
the both the student-level and school-based data. Furthermore, the scores of students
whose teachers did not participate in TIF increased. The caveat is that the growth
definition must remain the same. A well-designed merit pay program will encourage
educators to create lessons that respond to their students‘ diverse educational needs.
Without a doubt in my mind, these highly effective teachers will achieve academic
greatness.
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Recommendations
The Teacher Incentive Fund was designed to reward highly effective teachers for
increasing the academic achievement of low-performing students. Nonetheless, there
were three out of ten math teachers at one TIF-eligible Title I middle school in particular
who did not participate in TIF, but their students scored higher than the students of
teachers who participated. The results presented in this study uncovered that highly
effective teachers produce academically successful students—their participation in a
performance pay program notwithstanding. As a result of these findings, a
recommendation for further study would be a follow-up questionnaire at the end of the
school year surveying the highly effective teachers who were eligible to participate in
TIF, but chose not to participate. What were their reasons for choosing not to participate?
Was there a perceived barrier for success that discouraged them from participating? Since
their students showed learning gains, would they participate in the program the following
year? Have their attitudes for not participating been altered in any way? Their responses
to these questions would provide insight for designing an incentive pay program that
encouraged all teachers to seek rewards for their outstanding classroom efforts.
Another recommendation involves surveying the mindset of highly effective
teachers in high-needs schools. As documented in this study, the teachers at the TIFineligible Title I middle schools had students who demonstrated learning gains, in spite of
the absence of an incentive program. What motivated these teachers to be successful?
What is their perception of incentive programs? Would they participate in one, if given
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the opportunity? Their responses to these questions would complement the body of
knowledge on performance pay programs.
Replicating this study with a larger sample of teacher participants from TIF award
grantees in other Florida school districts or surveying TIF participating teachers about the
instructional strategies they implemented would provide additional insight into
performance pay plans. This data for this dissertation was limited to math scores; another
study could focus on the results of another Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test®,
such as reading or science.

Chapter Summary
This study analyzed the impact of a teacher incentive program in a Central Florida
public school district. The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) awarded highly effective
teachers with cash bonuses for increasing the test scores of its low-performing students.
However, this study also noted that highly effective teachers who chose not to participate
had students with increased test scores as well. Further, inconsistent trends among the
Title I middle schools in their five-year scores were observed. During the two years after
the incentive program was implemented, Title I middle schools that were eligible to
participate in TIF experienced lower scores whereas middle schools that were not eligible
to participate posted higher scores.
This chapter included the policy developments on the first phase of winners
awarded Race to the Top education grants and Florida‘s Merit Pay plan. U.S.
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Department of Education Secretary Arne Duncan hoped to provide funding for more
states as Florida struggled with adopting its own performance pay plan amid a firestorm
of opposition.
This researcher concluded that TIF had a positive impact on the learning gains of
low-performing students. The test scores of students whose teachers participated in TIF
achieved higher learning gains. Interestingly, students of teachers who chose not to
participate in TIF had increased learning gains also. Furthermore, high-needs schools that
were not eligible to participate had higher scores as the incentive program was
implemented at other middle schools within its district. The outcomes of teachers who
chose not to participate and schools that were ineligible for the program created an
opportunity for additional research. Also, extending the scope of this research to other
subject areas and to other Florida districts that were recipients of the TIF grant would
expand the body of knowledge on the impact of teacher incentive programs on lowperforming students.
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FCAT® ACHIEVEMENT LEVELS

The Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® (FCAT®) measured student
performance on selected benchmarks in reading, mathematics, writing, and science that
were defined by the Sunshine State Standards (SSS). The SSS articulated challenging
content that Florida students were expected to know and to be able to do. The SSS were
developed in seven content areas and were adopted by the State Board of Education in
May 1996. Achievement Levels described the success a student had achieved on the
Florida SSS tested on the FCAT® Reading, Mathematics, Science, and Writing
assessments (see Table 24).

Table 28
Achievement Level Policy Definitions

Level 5

This student had success with the most challenging content of the SSS. A
student who scored at Level 5 answered most of the test questions
correctly, including the most challenging questions.

Level 4

This student had success with the challenging content of the SSS. A
student who scored at Level 4 answered most of the test questions
correctly, but may have had only some success with questions that
reflected the most challenging content.

Level 3

This student had partial success with the challenging content of the SSS,
but performance was inconsistent. A student who scored at Level 3
answered many of the test questions correctly but was generally less
successful with questions that were the most challenging.

Level 2

This student had limited success with the challenging content of the SSS.

Level 1

This student had little success with the challenging content of the SSS.

Note. From Florida Department of Education, 2008.
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Achievement Levels were based on both Developmental Scale Scores and scale
scores. In Table 25, Achievement Levels ranged from one (lowest) to five (highest) with
corresponding Developmental Scale Scores that ranged from zero to about 3000 across
grades three through ten and were reported only for FCAT® SSS Reading and
Mathematics. Developmental Scale Scores linked two years of student FCAT® data that
tracked a student‘s progress over time. Students should have received higher scores as
they moved from grade-to-grade according to their increased achievement.
Developmental Scale Scores cannot be used to measure learning gains for FCAT®
Science because students were not tested on this subject at each grade level. In Table 26,
scale scores ranged from 100 (lowest) to 500 (highest) with corresponding Achievement
Levels of one through five. Scale scores were reported for all FCAT® SSS subjects
(Florida Department of Education, 2008).
Table 25 FCAT® Mathematics Developmental Scale Scores
Grade
6
7
8

Level 1
770 - 1553
958 - 1660
1025 - 1732

Level 2
1554 - 1691
1661 - 1785
1733 - 1850

Level 3
1692 - 1859
1786 - 1938
1851 - 1997

Level 4
1860 - 2018
1939 - 2079
1998 - 2091

Level 5
2019 - 2492
2080 - 2572
2092 - 2605

Level 4
354 - 390
344 - 378
347 - 370

Level 5
391 - 500
379 - 500
371 - 500

Note. From Florida Department of Education, 2008.

Table 26 FCAT® Mathematics Scale Scores
Grade
6
7
8

Level 1
100 - 282
100 - 274
100 - 279

Level 2
283 - 314
275 - 305
280 - 309

Level 3
315 - 353
306 - 343
310 - 346

Note. From Florida Department of Education, 2008.
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TEACHER INCENTIVE FUND GRANTEE PROFILES

Program Name

LEA

Award Amount

Incentive
Award

Chugach School
Alaska Teacher and
District (Rural
Principal Incentive Project
Alaska)

Yr 1: $1,278,773
Yr 2: $1,204,256
Yr 3: $1,046,050

$2500 $5500

Amphitheater Unified
School District Project
EXCELL!

Amphitheater
Unified School
District (Tucson,
AZ)

Yr 1: $4,700,840
Yr 2: $7,695,147

up to
$10,000

Beggs Independent
School District System to
Motivate and Reward
Teachers (SMART)

Beggs(OK)
Independent
School District

Yr 1: $507,514
Yr 2: $463,665

$1000 $5000

Chicago Public Schools
TAP

Chicago (IL)
Public Schools

Yr 1: $131,273
Yr 2: $4,055,600
Yr 3: $6,680,488

$2000 $5000

Community Training and
Assistance Center and the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Schools Leadership for
Educator's Advanced
Performance

Community
Training and
Assistance Center
(Charlotte, NC)

Yr 1: $1,987,589
Yr 2: $2,906,012

up to
10% of
salary

Cumberland County
Cumberland
Schools Teacher Incentive County (NC)
Fund Program
Schools

Yr 1: $1,174,176
Yr 2: $655,312

up to
$10,000

Dallas Principal and
Teacher Incentive Pay
Program

Yr 1: $126,139
Yr 2: $777,989
Yr 3: $10,368,036

$7500 $10,000

Dallas (TX)
Independent
School District

Note. Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2008.
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Program Name

LEA

Award Amount

Incentive
Award

Eagle County School
District PerformanceBased Compensation
Program

Yr 1: $1,562,129
Eagle County (CO)
Yr 2: $1,427,150
School District
Yr 3: $1,403,227

Edward W. Brooke
Charter School Teacher
Excellence Incentive
Project

Edward W. Brooke
Charter School
(Roslindale, MA)

Yr 1: $295,090
Yr 2: $228,732

up to
$5000

Fort Lupton Teacher
Incentive Fund

Weld County (CO)
Re-8 School
District

Yr 1: $937,040
Yr 2: $755,482
Yr 3: $738,049

$560 $2170

Guilford County Schools
Mission Possible

Guilford County
(NC) Schools

Yr 1: $1,790,060
Yr 2: $1,450,376
Yr 3: $1,789,997

$2500 $5000

Harrison School District
Two Recognizing
Engagement in the
Advancement of Learning

Harrison School
District Two (El
Paso, CO)

Yr 1: $1,170,393
Yr 2: $399,529

$1000 $2000

Hillsborough County
Public Schools
Performance Outcomes
with Effective Rewards

Hillsborough
County Public
Schools (Tampa,
FL)

Yr 1: $3,088,827
Yr 2: $4,110,855

$1,091.96

Houston Independent
School District Project
SMART

Houston (TX)
Independent
School District

Yr 1: $3,991,330
Yr 2: $2,994,775
Yr 3: $2,197,532

up to
$3000

Lynwood (CA)
Lynwood Unified School
Unified School
District Qwest for Success
District

Yr 1: $2,288,832
Yr 2: $2,140,281

N/A

Note. N/A – monetary award information not available.
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up to
$10,000

Program Name

LEA

Award Amount

Incentive
Award

Mare Island Technical
Academy (MIT
Academy), The New 3's:
Rigor, Results and
Rewards

MIT Academy
Mare Island
Technical
Academy (Vallejo,
CA)

Yr 1: $417,428
Yr 2: $312,658
Yr 3: $216,107

Memphis City Schools
Effective Practice
Incentive Community
(EPIC)

Memphis (TN)
City Schools

Yr 1: $3,109,944
Yr 2: $2,196,767
Yr 3: $2,206,948

up to
$7500

Miami-Dade County
Public Schools Project
RISE

Miami-Dade
Yr 1: $2,691,841
County (FL) Public
Yr 2: $3,761,377
Schools

$2500 $3000

National Charter Schools
Effective Practice
Incentive Community
(EPIC)

New Leaders for
New Schools
(NYC, NY)

Yr 1: $4,921,435
Yr 2: $1,866,502
Yr 3: $3,627,374

$3000 $4000

National Institute for
Excellence in Teaching,
Teacher Advancement
Program

National Institute
for Excellence in
Teaching (New
Orleans, LA)

Yr 1: $1,219,957
Yr 2: $4,047,871

minimum
$3000

Northern New Mexico
Performance-Based
Compensation Program

Northern New
Mexico Network
for Rural
Education
(NNMNRE)
(Espanola and
Taos, NM)

Yr 1: $571,074
Yr 2: $1,656,596
Yr 3: $1,753,600

$2434 $3651

Ohio Teacher Incentive
Fund (OTIF)

Ohio Department
of Education

Yr 1: $5,510,860
Yr 2: $5,739,063
Yr 3: $2,944,338

$2,000
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N/A

Program Name

LEA

Award Amount

Incentive
Award

Orange County Public
Schools - Recognizing
Excellence in
Achievement and
Professionalism

Orange County
(FL) Public
Schools

Yr 1: $6,595,095
Yr 2: $5,390,282

up to $4000

Partnership for Innovation
in Compensation for
Charters Schools (PICCS)

Center for
Educational
Innovation Public Education
Association
(NYC, NY)

Yr 1: $1,647,819
Yr 2: $2,638,847

up to $5000

Philadelphia Teacher and
Principal Incentive Fund
Project

School District
of Philadelphia
(PA)

Yr 1: $1,443,017
Yr 2: $2,048,208
Yr 3: $3,638,551

N/A

Prince Georges County
Public Schools Financial
Incentive Rewards for
Supervisors and Teachers

Prince Georges
County (MD)
Public Schools

Yr 1: $572,425
Yr 2: $2,418,297

$10,000

salary will
increase as
much as
40% during
25-year
career

Professional
Compensation System for
Teachers and Principals
(ProComp)

Denver (CO)
Public Schools

Yr 1: $5,747,869
Yr 2: $2,632,380
Yr 3: $5,588,227

School of Excellence in
Education Teacher and
Principals Awarded for
Student Achievement

School of
Excellence in
Education (San
Antonio, TX)

Yr 1: $684,373
Yr 2: $711,714

South Carolina Teacher
Advancement Program
(TAP)

Florence County
School District
Three (Lake
City, SC)

Yr 1: $1,950,250
Yr 2: $956,259
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N/A

$500 $10,000

Program Name

LEA

Award Amount

Incentive
Award

South Carolina Teacher
Incentive Fund

South Carolina
Department of
Education

Yr 1: $7,503,051
Yr 2: $5,965,279
Yr 3: $7,445,991

$2000 $5000

South Dakota Incentive
Fund

South Dakota

Yr 1: $4,762,694
Yr 2: $4,661,292

$750 $1500

University of Texas
System Teacher Incentive
Fund Program

University of
Texas System

Yr 1: $1,438,787
Yr 2: $7,145,714

$200 $5000

Yr 1: $3,036,837
Yr 2: $1,159,619
Yr 3: 2,847,471

$8,000

Washington, DC Effective District of
Practice Incentive
Columbia Public
Community
Schools
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YEAR 1 TIF SUMMATIVE SURVEY RESULTS
(N = 461)
Please mark the box that represents your
current beliefs.
I am confident that I have a complete
understanding of the requirements and
processes related to the TIF grant.
The professional development that I took for
TIF was relevant to the content that I teach.
I have the support necessary to implement
what I have learned through the TIF
professional development.
I have used many of the concepts/strategies
that I learned through the TIF professional
development in my classroom instruction.
The professional development that I took for
TIF has had a positive impact on my teaching.
In my school, the TIF initiative is often
referenced during formal and informal
meetings of the faculty.

I
Strongly I Agree
Agree

I Am
Not
Sure

I
I
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree

Total
%
Agree

Total
% Not
Sure

Total %
Disagree

219

198

29

15

0

90%

6%

3%

195

225

19

22

0

91%

4%

5%

250

198

13

0

0

97%

3%

0%

199

237

12

13

0

95%

3%

3%

269

162

19

11

0

93%

4%

2%

200

234

16

11

0

94%

3%

2%

Note. From U.S. Department of Education, 2007.
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YEAR 1 TIF SUMMATIVE SURVEY RESULTS
(N = 461)
Please mark the box that represents your
current beliefs.

I
Strongly I Agree
Agree

I Am
Not
Sure

I
I
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree

Total
%
Agree

Total
% Not
Sure

Total %
Disagree

I believe that my participation in TIF will have
impact on the achievement of my students.

220

199

33

9

0

91%

7%

2%

TIF is a significant element of our school
improvement efforts.
I think that the requirements for the receiving
of the TIF incentive award is fair and
equitable.

283

140

29

9

0

92%

6%

2%

191

216

43

10

1

88%

9%

2%

I am happy that our school was chosen to
participate in TIF.
I am planning to participate in TIF next year.

303

134

18

6

0

95%

4%

1%

274

145

42

0

0

91%

9%

0%

Note. From U.S. Department of Education, 2007.
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ORANGE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
TEACHER RETENTION BY TIF SCHOOL
SCHOOL YEARS: 2006-07 & 2007-08

TIF Participating
Schools

Instructional
Staff

Retired

Dismissed

Resigned

Transferred

Total Turnover

Teachers
Retained

% Retained

20062007

20072008

20062007

20072008

20062007

20072008

20062007

20072008

20062007

20072008

20062007

20072008

20062007

20072008

20062007

20072008

School A

68

55

0

1

2

2

23

21

3

10

28

34

40

21

59%

38%

School B

176

139

2

3

8

7

40

30

11

37

61

77

115

62

65%

45%

School C

66

55

1

2

0

0

16

11

2

8

19

21

47

34

71%

62%

School D

97

86

2

4

0

2

18

7

2

7

22

20

75

66

77%

77%

School E

73

69

1

2

0

2

16

18

1

8

18

30

55

39

75%

57%

School F

67

55

0

2

1

6

16

14

5

9

22

31

45

24

67%

44%

School G

122

117

3

2

8

5

24

37

3

10

38

54

84

63

69%

54%

School H

75

61

0

0

5

4

17

11

2

14

24

29

51

32

68%

52%

School I

83

72

2

1

2

0

10

15

1

8

15

24

68

48

82%

67%

School J

78

67

1

1

0

2

16

16

1

8

18

27

60

40

77%

60%

26

30

196

180

31

119

265

347

640

429

3%

4%

22%

23%

3%

15%

29%

45%

71%

55%

905
776
12
18
Total
As % of
Total
1%
2%
Teachers
Note. From U.S. Department of Education,
2007.
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ANNUAL STATE REPORT CARD

The Florida Department of Education (2010a) published an Annual State Report
Card as a part of Florida‘s School Accountability System. The School Accountability
System tracked student learning gains based on the state‘s academic standards from year
to year. The system allowed the improvement of individual students to be tracked from
one school year to the next based on FCAT® Development Scale Scores in reading and
mathematics from third through tenth grade (Florida Department of Education, 2010a).
The Annual State Report Card assigned a school grade as determined by the
accumulation of percentage points for eight measures of achievement and two additional
conditions:
1. One point for each percent of students who scored at or above FCAT®
Achievement Level 3 in reading.
2. One point for each percent of students who scored at or above FCAT®
Achievement Level 3 in mathematics.
3. One point for each percent of students who scored at or above FCAT®
Achievement Level 3 in science.
4. One point for each percent of students who scored at or above 3.5 on the
FCAT® writing assessment.
5. One point for each percent of students who made learning gains in reading.
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6. One point for each percent of students who made learning gains in
mathematics.
7. One point for each percent of the lowest performing students who made
learning gains in reading.
8. One point for each percent of the lowest performing students who made
learning gains in mathematics.
The points from each of these eight measures of achievement were added together
and converted into a school grading scale shown in Table 24.

Table 29
2009 School Grading Scale
Grade
A
B
C
D
F

Total Points
525 and above
495 – 524
435 – 494
395 – 434
Less than 395

Note. From Florida Department of Education, 2010a.

The two additional conditions added to the point system were: (1) schools that
earned enough total points to earn a grade of ―A‖ must also have tested at least 95% of
the eligible students; all other letter grade designations were based on a minimum of 90%
tested and (2) a school with enough points to have earned an ―A‖ must have shown
learning gains among the low-performing students in both reading and math for the
current year; a school with enough points to have earned a ―B‖ or ―C‖ must have shown
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learning gains of the low-performing students in both reading and mathematics for either
the current or previous year (Florida Department of Education, 2010a).
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2007 & 2008 FCAT® MATHEMATICS,
SCIENCE, AND OVERALL PEROFRMANCE
REPORT FOR OCPS TIF SCHOOLS

Eligible TIF Schools

TIF MS – 01
TIF MS – 02
TIF MS – 03
TIF MS – 04
TIF MS – 05
TIF MS – 06
TIF MS – 07
TIF HS – 01
TIF HS – 02
TIF HS – 03
Middle School Mean Points
Earned on FCAT®
High School Mean Points Earned
on FCAT®
Total Mean Points Earned on
FCAT®

Points for
Students
Achieving at or
Above Grade
Level in
Mathematics
(Level 3 or
Higher)

Points for
Students
Achieving at
or Above
Grade Level
in Science
(Level 3 or
Higher)

2007
39
56
48
29
42
58
45
48
54
48

2008
39
64
57
35
46
59
44
57
60
55

2007
13
28
21
12
21
30
17
11
9
18

2008
19
40
30
12
25
40
17
18
21
17

2007
422
507
467
403
446
473
456
371
430
384

2008
454
534
521
430
484
500
450
421
409
434

45.3

49.1

20.3

26.4

453.4

481.9

50.0

57.3

12.7

18.7

395

421.3

46.7

51.6

18

23.9

435.9

463.7

Note. From U.S. Department of Education, 2007.
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Total Report
Card Points
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